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INTRODUCTION
If you take a hard look around, you might get the sense that our society is 
drifting toward a bifurcated narrative of the human fetus.1  One line of the fetal 
narrative is epitomized by the restructuring of criminal codes in order to 
protect fetuses from acts of violence.  Such legislation tends to define fetuses 
as “human beings” or “persons,” and to meld, in terms of classification and 
punishment, acts that cause the death of either born persons or fetuses.  It is 
worth emphasizing that these new laws are not merely conceptual 
extrapolations of the mother’s reproductive rights – they apply, as it turns out, 
irrespective of whether the mother wants, or is aware of, her pregnancy.  Yet 
despite this expanding legal recognition of fetuses, there is, of course, another 
line of the fetal narrative.  This is the fetus’s near-absolute subordination to 
maternal liberty; a clear hierarchy of legal status which manifests itself most 
pronouncedly in the constitutional right to abortion.  Indeed, both lines of the
fetal narrative are deeply entrenched in our societal institutions.
This bifurcated approach to fetal rights, as it currently exists in most 
jurisdictions, leads to some interesting, and perhaps awkward, results.  
Imagine, for instance, a pregnant woman who approaches an abortion clinic 
with the intention of terminating her pregnancy.  In one scenario, she is 
mugged at the entrance, and, due to the ensuing trauma, has a miscarriage.  
The law holds that a “person” was “murdered,” and it punishes the perpetrator 
with a life sentence in jail.  In the second scenario, the woman evades the 
mugger, enters the clinic safely, and undergoes a successful abortion 
procedure.  Here the law holds that no crime was committed.
The above hypothetical illustrates a potential flaw in our current approach to 
fetal rights.  The woman intending to terminate her pregnancy, but assaulted on 
her way, was, as far as the law is concerned, carrying a person in her womb.  
Which prompts the question: What happened to the person in her womb when, 
in the second scenario, she evaded the mugger?  Proponents of abortion rights 
are undoubtedly distressed by the terminological shift from “fetus” to “human 
being” or “person.”2  After all, our legal tradition, excluding a few discrete and 
well-defined exceptions, knows of no liberty to cause the death of another 
human being.3  Due to the strong liberty interests lying in the balance, a 
1 For the sake of simplicity, the terms “fetus” and “fetal,” unless otherwise noted, 
encompass all stages of gestation from fertilization to birth.  In reality, the fetal period
begins around the ninth week of pregnancy.  See KEITH L. MOORE & T.V.N. PERSAUD, THE 
DEVELOPING HUMAN: CLINICALLY ORIENTED EMBRYOLOGY 3 (7th ed. 2003).
2 See infra discussion Part I.D.
3 See, e.g., MODEL PENAL CODE § 3.04(2)(b) (1962) (“The use of deadly force is not 
justifiable under this Section unless the actor believes that such force is necessary to protect 
himself against death, serious bodily injury, kidnapping or sexual intercourse compelled by 
force or threat.”).  The criminal law has occasionally permitted an actor to use deadly force
in self-defense even if the one killed did not intentionally seek to inflict harm.  A woman, 
for example, could claim self-defense in shooting a 3-year-old who pointed a loaded gun at 
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detailed theoretical examination of the interplay between fetal homicide and 
abortion rights seems warranted.
Juxtaposing fetal-homicide laws and abortion rights prompts two basic 
inquiries.  First, do fetal-homicide laws in fact reflect a societal recognition of 
fetal “personhood”?  Second, is fetal personhood compatible, in either a 
political or moral sense, with the “liberty” justification for abortion?  Each 
question raises intriguing and complex issues.  The first query has received 
scant treatment in the philosophical and legal literature.4  Most scholars seem 
content to avoid the issue by challenging its very relevance, thereby seeking 
solace in the legalistic claim that any expansion of statutory personhood will 
not directly affect interpretations of the constitutional “person” central to 
abortion litigation.5  But, as to the second question, there has been a 
longstanding and extensive debate between theorists.  A few leading scholars, 
such as Judith Jarvis Thomson and Anita Allen, have famously argued that the 
“humanness” or “personhood” of fetuses would not necessarily render the 
abortion procedure contrary to our notions of justice.6  This position has 
generated tremendous controversy within academic circles, with the majority 
of commentators, including liberal constitutionalists like Ronald Dworkin and 
her, even if the child had been too young to form criminal intent. JOSHUA DRESSLER,
UNDERSTANDING CRIMINAL LAW 197 (2d ed. 1995) (citing SANFORD H. KADISH & STEPHEN 
J. SCHULHOFER, CRIMINAL LAW AND ITS PROCESSES 876 (5th ed. 1989)).
4 One notable exception is Professor Carolyn Ramsey, who takes the position that fetal-
homicide statutes “do not provide clear evidence that the unborn are ubiquitously becoming 
‘persons’ under law.”  Carolyn B. Ramsey, Restructuring the Debate Over Fetal Homicide 
Laws, 67 OHIO ST. L.J. 721, 737 (2006).
5 Jeffrey Rosen, A Viable Solution, LEGAL AFF., Sept.-Oct. 2003, available at
http://www.legalaffairs.org/printerfriendly.msp?id=435 (“Far from threatening abortion 
rights, the fetal-homicide statutes provide a model for a pluralistic approach to reproductive 
rights.”); id. (quoting Ronald Dworkin as stating that statutory assertions of fetal 
“personhood” are “a kind of shorthand for describing the complex network of rights and 
duties, and so long as states do not use the shorthand to curtail or diminish constitutional 
rights, there can be no constitutional objection”).
6 Judith Jarvis Thomson, A Defense of Abortion, 1 PHIL. & PUB. AFF. 47, 48-49 (1971) 
(analogizing a fetus to a violin player plugged into one’s body for a period of nine months, 
and arguing that it would be morally permissible to unplug the violinist even if one knew the 
violinist would die as a result); see also Anita L. Allen, Taking Liberties: Privacy, Private 
Choice, and Social Contract Theory, 56 U. CIN. L. REV. 461, 468 (1987) (arguing that the 
hypothetical connection to the violinist has no moral bearing on the woman’s right to choose 
to remain connected); Donald Regan, Rewriting Roe v. Wade, 77 MICH. L. REV. 1569, 1569 
(1979) (“It is a deeply rooted principle of American law that an individual is ordinarily not 
required to volunteer aid to another individual who is in danger or in need of assistance.”); 
cf. Ramsey, supra note 4, at 738 (“The pro-choice camp would be better served by arguing 
that, although the fetus may be a human being (or even a person in some legal contexts), the 
choice to prevent it from being born still belongs to the woman, but not to her attacker.”).
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Jack Balkin, contending that a societal understanding of fetal personhood 
cannot be reconciled with a general right to abortion.7
When surveying the academic landscape relating to these two questions, one 
realizes a regrettable soft spot: the absence of a thorough analysis of John 
Rawls’s philosophy.8  Rawls is, after all, considered by many to have been the 
most important political philosopher of the twentieth century.  It was Robert 
Nozick who, in paying what is surely the ultimate compliment, wrote that 
“[p]olitical philosophers now must either work within Rawls’ theory or explain 
why not.”9  And, beyond academia, a large swath of the public, explicitly or 
otherwise, shares Rawls’s fundamental view that “justice is fairness.”10
Perhaps this quiet surrounding Rawls’s work is best explained by the fact 
that his views on abortion were ambiguous and non-committal, and that he 
altogether ignored the emergence of fetal-homicide laws.  He reiterated near 
the end of his life that he had not reached any firm moral conclusion on 
7 RONALD DWORKIN, LIFE’S DOMINION: AN ARGUMENT ABOUT ABORTION, EUTHANASIA,
AND INDIVIDUAL FREEDOM 111 (1993) (“But abortion normally requires a physical attack on 
a fetus, not just a failure to aid it, and, in any case, parents are invariably made an exception 
to the general doctrine because they have a legal duty to care for their children.”); Jack 
Balkin, How New Genetic Technologies Will Transform Roe v. Wade, 56 EMORY L.J. 843, 
846 (forthcoming 2007), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=964508 (“Why could states 
decriminalize murder simply because of who the victim’s parents were or because the 
victim’s conception was not consensual?  These conclusions do not mesh well with how 
most people – even those with strong moral objections – feel about abortion.”); see also
KRISTIN LUKER, ABORTION AND THE POLITICS OF MOTHERHOOD 5-6 (1984) (suggesting that 
the recognition of fetuses as persons would undermine abortion rights); Lynn M. Paltrow, 
Pregnant Drug Users, Fetal Persons, and the Threat to Roe v. Wade, 62 ALB. L. REV. 999, 
1000 (1999) (“If fetuses are recognized as full legal persons, then their right to life must, as 
a matter of constitutional law, be protected – and all abortions outlawed.”); Jed Rubenfeld, 
On the Legal Status of the Proposition That “Life Begins at Conception,” 43 STAN. L. REV.
599, 627 (1991) (“I do not question the conclusion that a state could override a woman’s 
privacy rights if it were able to determine in advance that the fetus was a person.”).
8 But see, e.g., JEFFREY H. REIMAN, ABORTION AND THE WAYS WE VALUE HUMAN LIFE
113-14 (1999) (briefly discussing Rawls’s views on public reasoning); Robert P. George, 
Public Reason and Political Conflict: Abortion and Homosexuality, 106 YALE L.J. 2475, 
2476 (1997) (arguing that Rawlsian public reason is purposely designed to induce dissenters 
to accede to liberal hegemony); Charles I. Lugosi, Conforming to the Rule of Law: When 
Person and Human Being Finally Mean the Same Thing in Fourteenth Amendment 
Jurisprudence, 22 ISSUES L. & MED. 119, 142 (2007) (briefly speculating on how Rawls 
might have viewed the recognition of fetuses as “human beings” but not “persons”).
9 See, e.g., ROBERT NOZICK, ANARCHY, STATE, AND UTOPIA 183 (1974).
10 See, e.g., Martha Nussbaum, The Enduring Significance of John Rawls, CHRON.
HIGHER EDUC. (Wash., D.C.), July 20, 2001, § 2 (Magazine), at B7 (“[Rawls’s] ideas are 
central starting points in many nations for discussions of justice.”); see also RONALD 
DWORKIN, TAKING RIGHTS SERIOUSLY 149 (1977) (“Professor Rawls, of Harvard . . . has 
published an abstract and complex book about justice which no constitutional lawyer will be 
able to ignore.”).
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abortion, writing, “I don’t say the most reasonable or decisive argument; I 
don’t know what that would be, or even if it exists.”11  But while Rawls might 
have been agnostic on abortion, he nonetheless left behind a coherent 
theoretical model with which to analyze the justness of policy determinations.  
And what one finds, upon closer analysis, is that his philosophy is particularly 
well-suited to measure the sustainability of a legal scheme that punishes fetal 
homicide while permitting abortion.
The goal of this Article is to evaluate the bifurcated fetal-rights scheme in 
the light of Rawls’s political philosophy.  In particular, it seeks to discern 
whether the current set of fetal-homicide laws indicates a societal recognition 
of fetal personhood, and, if so, whether this renders the right to abortion 
inconsistent with our principles of justice.  This Article proceeds in three 
Parts.  The first Part outlines the contours of the fetal-rights scheme and 
demonstrates that it is an established societal judgment with robust institutional 
support.12  The middle Part introduces Rawls’s philosophy, and explains how it 
can, under certain circumstances, provide us with insight into the stability of 
public policies.  The final Part, which constitutes the core of the Article, uses 
Rawls’s philosophical model to gauge the stability of the bifurcated fetal-rights 
scheme.  Specifically, it demonstrates that, in a Rawlsian society, the 
emergence of our current fetal-homicide laws necessarily reflects a public 
understanding that fetuses are represented at the “original position.”  This Part 
then goes on to evaluate the circumstances in which the current fetal-rights 
scheme – a blend of fetal-homicide laws and abortion rights – could be 
affirmed by a Rawlsian.  The Article concludes by briefly speculating about 
how Rawls’s philosophy might impact our views on fetal rights in the coming 
decades.
I. THE BIFURCATED FETAL-RIGHTS SCHEME
The law currently endorses a bifurcated characterization of human fetuses.13  
On the one hand, the legal status of the fetus has been greatly enhanced 
through the restructuring of criminal codes.14  On the other hand, fetal interests 
11 See JOHN RAWLS, The Idea of Public Reason Revisited, in JOHN RAWLS: COLLECTED 
PAPERS 573, 605 n.80 (Samuel Freeman ed., 1999) [hereinafter RAWLS, Public Reason 
Revisited].
12 Rawls uses the terms “societal judgments” and “societal convictions of justice” 
interchangeably throughout his work.  For a definition of “societal judgments,” see infra
note 135.
13 See, e.g., Note, What We Talk About When We Talk About Persons: The Language of 
Legal Fiction, 114 HARV. L. REV. 1745, 1766 (2001) (“[T]he doctrinal confusion regarding 
legal personhood evidences the two-mindedness of a society that finds fetal murder 
abhorrent even as it desires to protect the autonomy of pregnant women.”).
14 See Byrn v. N.Y. City Health & Hosps. Corp., 286 N.E.2d 887, 889 (N.Y. 1972) (“The 
process [of granting personhood] is, indeed, circular, because it is definitional.  Whether the 
law should accord legal personality is a policy question which in most instances devolves on 
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are nearly wholly subordinated to the liberty interests of their mothers.  This 
Section briefly describes the key components of the bifurcated fetal-rights 
scheme and documents how this hierarchy of rights has been strongly endorsed 
by our leading societal institutions.
A. Fetal Rights
One line of the fetal narrative is the fetus’s burgeoning legal status.  
Although there are many examples, this phenomenon is most clearly evinced 
by penal codes that (1) delineate fetuses as crime victims separate from their 
mothers, (2) explicitly define fetuses as “persons” or “human beings,” (3) 
classify offenses against fetuses with terminology suggestive of personhood, 
and (4) punish crimes against fetuses similarly to crimes against born 
persons.15
At common law a fetus was not considered a unique “victim” of a crime 
committed against its mother.16  Yet it is clear that, over the past few decades, 
society has begun to shift its views on the subject.17  Perhaps the most 
the Legislature, subject again of course to the Constitution as it has been ‘legally’ 
rendered.”); JOHN RAWLS, JUSTICE AS FAIRNESS: A RESTATEMENT 19-20 (Erin Kelly ed., 
2001) [hereinafter RAWLS, RESTATEMENT] (“[T]he conception of the person is worked up 
from the way citizens are regarded in the public political culture of a democratic society. . . .  
For these interpretations we look . . . to courts, political parties, and statesmen . . . .”); cf.
Levy v. Louisiana, 391 U.S. 68, 70 (1968) (“[I]llegitimate children are not ‘nonpersons.’  
They are humans, live, and have their being.”).
15 There are, of course, other, perhaps less persuasive, indicia of fetal personhood in the 
laws of tort, property, or equity.  See, e.g., Cowles v. Cowles, 13 A. 414, 417 (Conn. 1887) 
(holding that a child born six months after the testator’s death was in existence, in 
contemplation of law, and therefore a beneficiary); Raleigh Fitkin-Paul Morgan Mem’l 
Hosp. v. Anderson, 201 A.2d 537, 538 (N.J. 1964) (holding that an unborn child had a right 
to medical care despite the mother’s refusal to consent to a blood transfusion on religious 
grounds); State v. Beale, 376 S.E.2d 1, 2 n.3 (N.C. 1989) (noting that the word “person” in 
the state’s wrongful death statute had been extended to impose civil liability for the killing 
of a fetus).
16 See, e.g., Mamta K. Shah, Note, Inconsistencies in the Legal Status of an Unborn 
Child: Recognition of a Fetus as Potential Life, 29 HOFSTRA L. REV. 931, 934 (2001) (citing 
Kayhan Parsi, Metaphorical Imagination: The Moral and Legal Status of Fetuses and 
Embryos, 2 DEPAUL J. HEALTH CARE L. 703, 718 (1999)); cf. United States v. Spencer, 839
F.2d 1341, 1343 (9th Cir. 1988) (“In 1908 it was well-established in common law that 
murder was the killing of one human being by another, and that an infant born alive that 
later died as a result of fetal injuries was a human being.”).
17 See Jean Reith Schroedel, Pamela Fiber & Bruce D. Snyder, Women’s Rights and 
Fetal Personhood in Criminal Law, 7 DUKE J. GENDER L. & POL’Y 89, 95, 117 (2000) 
(observing that “[b]y separating fetal killing from the crime against the pregnant woman, 
these states implicitly or explicitly accord the fetus at least limited personhood status” and 
that “[o]ne possible escape from this conundrum is a return to the idea that the interests of 
the woman and fetus are unitary”); Note, supra note 13, at 1756 (“[T]he act of criminalizing 
feticide, regardless of the method, sends a message about the state’s regard for fetal life and 
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pronounced example is the federal Unborn Victims of Violence Act of 2004 
(UVVA).18  The UVVA provides that if a child in utero is injured or killed 
during the commission of certain federal crimes of violence against its mother, 
then the assailant has committed an offense against two victims: the mother 
and the unborn child.19  During the UVVA debate, opponents of the proposed 
legislation introduced a substitute bill that retained the traditional view that a 
fetus is not a separate victim.20  The “single-victim” substitute would have, as a 
thereby implicitly grants fetuses limited personhood status.”); see also Shah, supra note 16, 
at 939 (mentioning how a majority of jurisdictions have extended the term “person” in their 
wrongful death statutes to include fetuses) (citing Mary Lynn Kime, Note, Hughes v. State:
The “Born Alive” Rule Dies a Timely Death, 30 TULSA L.J. 539, 550 (1995)).  But see State 
v. Merrill, 450 N.W.2d 318, 324 (Minn. 1990) (“People are free to differ or abstain on the 
profound philosophical and moral questions of whether an embryo is a human being, or on 
whether or at what stage the embryo or fetus is ensouled or acquires ‘personhood.’  These 
questions are entirely irrelevant to criminal liability under the statute.”).
18 Unborn Victims of Violence Act (Laci and Conner’s Law) of 2004, Pub. L. No. 108-
212, 118 Stat. 568 (codified at 18 U.S.C. § 1841 (Supp. IV 2004)).  The House of 
Representatives approved the bill on February 26, 2004, with a vote of 254–163.  150 CONG. 
REC. H667–68 (daily ed. Feb. 26, 2004).  For the entire debate on the UVVA in the House, 
see id. at H637–68.  The Senate approved it on March 25, 2004, with a vote of 61–38.  150 
CONG. REC. S3167 (daily ed. Mar. 25, 2004).  For the entire debate on the UVVA in the 
Senate, see id. at S3124–67.
19 18 U.S.C. § 1841(a)(1) (“Whoever engages in conduct that violates any of the 
provisions of [various federal criminal provisions] and thereby causes the death of, or bodily 
injury . . . to, a child, who is in utero at the time the conduct takes place, is guilty of a 
separate offense . . . .”).  The elements of fetal murder under the UVVA are: (1) the 
defendant violated one of the federal laws dealing with crimes of violence; and (2) the 
defendant’s criminal conduct caused the death of “a member of the species homo sapiens, at 
any stage of development, who is carried in the womb.”  Id.  Prior to the enactment of this 
law, an unborn child was not recognized as a victim with respect to violent crimes under 
federal law.  See 150 CONG. REC. S3145 (daily ed. Mar. 25, 2004) (statement of Sen. 
Feinstein) (warning of the potentially serious “repercussion[s]” that will result from
“giv[ing] a fertilized egg rights in the Federal law”).  The UVVA applies this two-victim 
principle to sixty-eight existing federal laws dealing with acts of violence (as well as all 
laws governing federal geographical jurisdictions and the military justice system). See 18 
U.S.C. § 1841(b) (listing the statutory provisions to which the UVVA applies).
20 Compare 150 CONG. REC. S3125 (daily ed. Mar. 25, 2004) (reporting Senator 
Feinstein’s separate bill punishing a third party for terminating a woman’s fetus as a 
separate offense against the third party), with 18 U.S.C. § 1841 (punishing a third party for 
terminating a woman’s pregnancy as a separate offense against the third party while also 
finding that the fetus is a separate victim).  Public sentiment seems to reflect the two-victim 
principle.  See Dana Blanton, Peterson Should Get Two Counts of Murder, FOXNEWS.COM, 
April 25, 2003, http://www.foxnews.com/story/0,2933,85158,00.html (citing a Fox 
News/Opinion Dynamics poll from April 22–23, 2003, in which eighty-four percent of 
respondents believed that Scott Peterson should be charged with two counts of homicide for 
murdering his wife and unborn child); Debra Rosenberg, The War over Fetal Rights, 
NEWSWEEK, June 9, 2003, at 40, 42–43 (discussing how “abortion-rights supporters are 
1184 BOSTON UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW [Vol. 87:1177
practical matter, implemented standards and punishments identical to the 
primary bill.  Despite this functional parity, Congress rejected the substitute 
bill, thereby making unequivocally clear its view of fetuses as separate and 
distinct victims from their mothers.21  In addition to the UVVA, thirty-six 
states have incorporated the double-victim approach into their penal codes.22
Perhaps not surprisingly, jurisdictions treating fetuses as unique victims 
reach different conclusions as to when such uniqueness vests.  The minority 
position is to focus on a particular point in the gestation process23 (such as 
finding it increasingly difficult to claim credibly that a fetus just a few weeks, or even days, 
from delivery is not entitled to at least some protections under the law”).
21 See 150 CONG. REC. S3145 (daily ed. Mar. 25, 2004) (statement of Sen. Hatch) 
(“Where our bills are different – and this is important – is the definition of when life 
begins.”).  Sharon Rocha, the mother of Laci Peterson, wrote the following to U.S. Senators:
I hope that every legislator will clearly understand that adoption of such a single-victim 
amendment . . . would be a painful blow to those, like me, who are left alive after a 
two-victim crime, because Congress would be saying that Conner and other innocent 
unborn victims like him are not really victims – indeed, that they never really existed at 
all.  
H.R. REP. NO. 108-420, pt. 1, at 4 n.4 (2004) (quoting Letter from Sharon Rocha to United 
States Senators Mike DeWine, Lindsey Graham, Orrin Hatch and United States 
Congresswoman Melissa Hart (June 16, 2003) (on file with House Committee on the 
Judiciary)).
22 See infra notes 23 & 25 and accompanying text.  Interestingly, the Supreme Court has 
held that a policy shared by thirty states constitutes a “national consensus,” at least for the 
purposes of an Eighth Amendment analysis.  See Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 551, 564 
(2005) (“When Atkins was decided, 30 States prohibited the death penalty for the mentally 
retarded. . . . By a similar calculation in this case, 30 States prohibit the juvenile death 
penalty, comprising 12 that have rejected the death penalty altogether and 18 that maintain it 
but, by express provision or judicial interpretation, exclude juveniles from its reach.”).  For 
a critique of this method of evaluating national consensus, see Tonja Jacobi, The Subtle 
Unraveling of Federalism: The Illogic of Using State Legislation as Evidence of an 
Evolving National Consensus 2 (Nw. Law Sch. Pub. Law & Legal Theory Research Paper 
Series, Research Paper No. 05-15, 2005), available at
http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=813124 (“Atkins and Roper confirmed 
and expanded an inherently defective practice, using state legislation as evidence of an 
evolving national consensus.”).
23 The minority view has been adopted by twelve jurisdictions. See ARK. CODE ANN. § 5-
1-102(13)(B)(i)(b) (2006) (twelve weeks); CAL. PENAL CODE § 187(a) (West 1999) (post-
embryonic stage, as construed in People v. Davis, 872 P.2d 591, 602 (Cal. 1994)); FLA.
STAT. ANN. §§ 782.071, .09 (West 2007) (viability and quickening, respectively); IND. CODE
ANN. §§ 35-42-1-1(4), -3(a)(2), -4(b) (West 2004 & Supp. 2006) (viability as defined in 
IND. CODE ANN. § 16-18-2-365 (West 2007)); IOWA CODE ANN. § 707.7 (West 2003) (end of 
second trimester); MD. CODE ANN., CRIM. LAW § 2-103 (LexisNexis Supp. 2006) (viability 
as defined in MD. CODE ANN., HEALTH-GEN. § 20-209 (LexisNexis 2005)); NEV. REV.
STAT. § 200.210 (2005) (quickening); N.Y. PENAL LAW § 125.00 (McKinney 2004) (end of 
twenty-four weeks); R.I. GEN. LAWS § 11-23-5 (2002) (quickening); TENN. CODE ANN. § 39-
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viability, quickening, or the post-embryonic stage).24  The clear majority of 
jurisdictions, however, provide that unborn children become legally separate 
entities upon their conception.25
It is worth noting that the double-victim concept is not a mere legal fiction 
devised for the purpose of fortifying the mother’s right to a violence-free 
pregnancy.  Importantly, fetal-homicide laws require neither that the mother be 
aware of her pregnancy at the time of the fetus’s death, nor that she endorse or 
acquiesce to the ensuing criminal prosecution.26  The double-victim approach 
indeed seems to mean what it says: a fetus is a protected entity unique and 
separate from its mother.
In addition to double-victim laws, the legal status of the fetus can also be 
gleaned from legislative definitions.27  Various jurisdictions have expressly 
13-214 (2006) (viability); WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 9A.32.060(1)(b) (West 2000) 
(quickening); Commonwealth v. Cass, 467 N.E.2d 1324, 1325 (Mass. 1984) (viability).
24 “Viability” occurs once a fetus has “a reasonable potential for subsequent survival 
if . . . removed from the uterus.”  Tara Kole & Laura Kadetsky, Recent Developments, The 
Unborn Victims of Violence Act, 39 HARV. J. ON LEGIS. 215, 217 n.28 (2002) (omission in 
original) (quoting Bicka A. Barlow, Comment, Severe Penalties for the Destruction of 
“Potential Life” – Cruel and Unusual Punishment?, 29 U.S.F. L. REV. 463, 471 (1995)).  
“Viability generally occurs between twenty and twenty-four weeks gestation, at about the 
end of the second trimester of pregnancy.”  Id.  By contrast, “[q]uickening is the point at 
which a fetus first moves within the womb or is capable of moving; this stage usually occurs 
between the sixteenth and twentieth week of pregnancy.”  Id. at 217 n.29 (citing Alison 
Tsao, Note, Fetal Homicide Laws: Shield Against Domestic Violence or Sword To Pierce 
Abortion Rights?, 25 HASTINGS CONST. L.Q. 457, 463 (1998)).  Finally, “[t]he post-embryo 
stage, when an embryo nominally becomes a fetus, occurs approximately seven to eight 
weeks into gestation.”  Id. at 217 n.30 (citing Davis, 872 P.2d at 599).
25 See infra App. A (describing the fetal-homicide laws of the twenty-four states that
recognize unique victim-status upon conception).  Conception is not synonymous with 
fertilization.  See, e.g., Rubenfeld, supra note 7, at 625 n.112 (stating that conception is 
complete only when the fertilized ovum implants itself in the woman’s uterus).
26 See Kole & Kadetsky, supra note 24, at 227 (observing that the UVVA’s “protection 
of the fetus during pregnancy is entirely disconnected with the woman’s ‘choice’ to 
continue her pregnancy”); see also People v. Taylor, 86 P.3d 881 (Cal. 2004) (upholding a 
murder conviction for causing the death of an eleven- to thirteen-week old fetus without 
addressing whether the mother had been aware of the pregnancy prior to her death).  For a 
discussion of the various reasons why victims of domestic abuse can be reluctant to 
cooperate with law enforcement investigations, see Deborah Epstein et al., Transforming 
Aggressive Prosecution Policies: Prioritizing Victims’ Long-Term Safety in the Prosecution 
of Domestic Violence Cases, 11 AM. U. J. GENDER SOC. POL’Y & L. 465, 472-84 (2003).
27 These statutory provisions are particularly relevant when one appreciates the 
expressive dimension of law.  This concept holds that law does more than simply regulate 
behavior; it embodies and signals social values and aspirations.  See Dan M. Kahan, Social 
Influence, Social Meaning, and Deterrence, 83 VA. L. REV. 349, 352-61 (1997) (describing 
how social influences can shape a person’s propensity to engage in crime); Cass R. 
Sunstein, On the Expressive Function of Law, 144 U. PA. L. REV. 2021, 2025-29 (1996) 
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stated that fetuses are “persons,” “human beings,” or “members of the species 
homo sapiens.”28  The federal UVVA defines a “child in utero” as “a member 
of the species homo sapiens, at any stage of development, who is carried in the 
womb.”29  Representative examples at the state level include Ohio's expansion 
of “person” to include “[a]n unborn human who is viable;”30 Pennsylvania's 
characterization of an “unborn child” as “an individual organism of the species 
homo sapiens from fertilization until live birth;”31 and Kentucky's proviso that 
an “unborn child” is “a member of the species homo sapiens in utero from 
conception onward, without regard to age, health, or condition of 
dependency.”32
(defining the “expressive function of law” as referring to the law’s attempt to influence 
social norms, though also noting that the phrase can be defined in other ways as well).
28 There are differing views on how the terms “persons” and “human beings” differ from 
one another.  In some jurisdictions, for example, there appears to be no meaningful 
distinction.  See Note, supra note 13, at 1749 (“When courts held that slaves were legal 
persons, they emphasized the obvious fact that slaves were human beings and relied on this 
fact to settle the issue.”); Cass, 467 N.E.2d at 1325 (“An offspring of human parents cannot 
reasonably be considered to be other than a human being, and therefore a person, first 
within, and then in normal course outside, the womb.”).  For a contrary view, see Ramsey, 
supra note 4, at 738 (stating that the difference between the two “constitutes more than 
formalistic hairsplitting” and stating that “[m]ore than sixty percent of states with fetal 
homicide laws eschew designating the fetus as a ‘person,’ instead calling it a ‘human 
being’”).
29 18 U.S.C. § 1841(d) (Supp. IV 2004).
30 OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 2901.01(B)(1)(a)(ii), (c)(i) (LexisNexis 2006); see also ALA.
CODE § 13A-6-1(a)(3) (LexisNexis Supp. 2006) (including “an unborn child in utero at any 
stage of development, regardless of viability” in the definitions of a “person” and “human 
being” for purposes of the state laws dealing with murder, manslaughter, criminally 
negligent homicide, and assault); ARK. CODE. ANN. § 5-1-102(13)(B)(i)(a), (b) (2006) 
(defining “person” to include a “living fetus of twelve (12) weeks or greater gestation,” at 
any stage of development); LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 14:2(7), (11) (2007) (stating that the 
definition of “person” includes “a human being from the moment of fertilization and 
implantation”); Cass, 467 N.E.2d at 1325-26 (ruling that a viable fetus is within the ambit of  
“person”  in the state’s homicide statute).
31 18 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 3203 (West 2000).
32 KY. REV. STAT. ANN. § 507A.010(1)(c) (LexisNexis Supp. 2006); see also ALASKA 
STAT. § 11.81.900(b)(62) (2006) (“‘[U]nborn child’ means a member of the species Homo 
sapiens, at any stage of development, who is carried in the womb.”); GA. CODE ANN. §§ 16-
5-20, -28, -80 (Supp. 2006) (defining “unborn child” as a member of the species homo 
sapiens); MISS. CODE ANN. § 97-3-37 (West 2005) (“‘[U]nborn child’ means a member of 
the species homo sapiens, at any stage of development, who is carried in the womb.”); NEB.
REV. STAT. § 28-389 (Supp. 2006) (defining “unborn child” as “an individual member of the 
species Homo sapiens, at any stage of development in utero, who was alive at the time of 
the homicidal act and died as a result thereof whether before, during, or after birth”); S.C.
CODE ANN. § 16-3-1083(C) (Supp. 2006) (defining “unborn child” in essentially the same 
manner as the previously cited statutes).  Moreover, the California Supreme Court recently 
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The expanding legal status of fetuses is further reflected by how
jurisdictions choose to classify criminal offenses. The majority of 
jurisdictions, in characterizing the unlawful killing of a fetus, have replaced the 
neutral term “feticide”33 with the far more suggestive language of “homicide,” 
“murder,” or “manslaughter.”34  This is significant in that these terms have
been utilized exclusively in our legal tradition to classify acts causing the death 
of human beings: “homicide” is “[t]he killing of one person by another,”35
“murder” is “[t]he killing of a human being [by another] with malice 
aforethought,”36 and “manslaughter” is “[t]he unlawful killing of a human 
being [by another] without malice aforethought.”37  
Lastly, it should be noted that many jurisdictions punish crimes against 
fetuses as if they were crimes against born persons.  The UVVA, for instance, 
draws almost no punitive distinctions between acts causing the death of the 
mother or fetus: “the punishment . . . is the same as the punishment provided 
under federal law for that conduct had that injury or death occurred to the 
unborn child’s mother.”38  Utah provides that the killing of an “unborn child” 
at any stage of prenatal development is no different than any other homicide.39  
Arizona holds that a victim who is “an unborn child at any stage of 
development,”40 shall, for the purposes of establishing the level of punishment, 
“be treated like a minor who is under twelve years of age.”41  And Texas 
defined an eleven- to thirteen- week-old fetus as a “person” for the purposes of its implied 
malice doctrine.  People v. Taylor, 86 P.3d 881, 884-85 (Cal. 2004).
33 BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 654 (8th ed. 2004) (defining “feticide” as an “act or 
instance of killing a fetus”).  
34 At least thirty states employ such language.  See infra App. A (listing twenty-four
states adopting the majority view, of which twenty define the crime as either murder, 
homicide, or manslaughter).  Of the jurisdictions adopting the minority view of victim 
status, ten states define the crime as either murder, homicide, or manslaughter.  See supra
note 23 (listing the jurisdictions adopting the minority view of victim status, of which 
Arkansas, California, Florida, Indiana, Maryland, Massachusetts, Nevada, Rhode Island, 
Tennessee, and Washington define the crime as either murder, homicide, or manslaughter).
35 BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 751 (8th ed. 2004).
36 Id. at 1043; see also Note, supra note 13, at 1747-48 (arguing that punishing the 
killing of a slave as “murder” constituted a “robust understanding of slaves’ personhood”).
37 BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 983 (8th ed. 2004).
38 18 U.S.C § 1841(a)(2)(A).  The UVVA, however, withholds the death penalty for an 
actor who kills only the fetus.  Id. § 1841(a)(2)(D) (“Notwithstanding any other provision of 
law, the death penalty shall not be imposed for an offense under this section.”).
39 UTAH CODE ANN. § 76-5-201(1)(a) (2003); cf. 18 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 2605(c) 
(West 1998) (“The penalty for voluntary manslaughter of an unborn child shall be the same 
as the penalty for voluntary manslaughter.”).
40 ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 13-604(V) (Supp. 2006).
41 Id. § 13-604.01(M); see also id. § 13-703 (treating unborn children and children under 
fifteen as being the same for the purpose of determining when someone sentenced to life can 
be released); id. § 13-1102 (applying the crime of negligent homicide to both born and 
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applies its entire criminal code to any offense against “an unborn child at every 
stage of gestation from fertilization until birth.”42
In sum, a large development in federal and state penal legislation has been 
to recognize fetuses as unique victims, define fetuses as “persons” or “human 
beings,” classify offenses against fetuses with terminology suggestive of 
personhood, and punish crimes against fetuses similarly to crimes against born 
persons.  This restructuring of the criminal codes has, perhaps not surprisingly, 
led some to identify an emerging societal understanding that fetuses are 
individual persons with protectable human rights.43
B. Subordinating Fetal Rights
The growing legal recognition of the fetus aside, there is another line to the 
fetal narrative: the subordination of the fetus to the liberty interests of its 
mother.44  This hierarchy of interests is most clearly reflected in (1) judicial 
holdings that a fetus is not a “person” under the Constitution, (2) judicial 
holdings that the Constitution ensures a right to abortion, and (3) legislation 
protecting a mother’s liberty interests.
The Supreme Court, in its landmark 1973 opinions, Roe v. Wade45 and Doe 
v. Bolton,46 held that the Constitution provides no affirmative protection to 
fetuses.  At issue in Roe was the constitutionality of a Texas statute 
unborn victims, with a few narrow exceptions); id. § 13-1103 (applying the crime of 
manslaughter to both born and unborn victims alike, with a few narrow exceptions); id. §
13-1104 (applying the crime of second degree murder to both born and unborn victims, with 
a few exceptions); id. §13-1105 (applying the crime of first degree murder to both born and 
unborn victims alike, with exceptions).
42 TEX. PENAL CODE ANN. § 1.07(a)(26) (Vernon Supp. 2006) (defining “individual”); cf.
TEX. CIV. PRAC. & REM. CODE ANN. § 71.001(4) (Vernon Supp. 2006) (providing an 
identical definition of an “individual” for the purposes of the civil code).
43 See infra discussion Part I.D (inventorying the leading arguments against the UVVA).  
One leading critic of this view is Professor Carolyn Ramsey, who argues that fetal-homicide
statutes “do not provide clear evidence that the unborn are ubiquitously becoming ‘persons’ 
under law.”  Ramsey, supra note 4, at 737.  It seems, however, that Professor Ramsey fails 
to sufficiently address the close definitional nexus between “human beings” and “persons” 
in some jurisdictions, or the fact that many jurisdictions similarly punish acts against fetuses 
and born persons.  While a legitimate debate can be had whether fetuses have the status of 
“persons” under the law, it is becoming increasingly unreasonable to deny that society views
fetuses as individual “human beings.”
44 While this Section focuses on the embryo’s status while it is inside the mother’s 
womb, the absence of the embryo’s personhood status vis-à-vis the mother seems to apply 
equally to embryos outside the womb.  For example, third-party destruction of embryos 
created in vitro for scientific research is lawful because of their mothers’ consent, be it 
explicit or implicit.
45 410 U.S. 113, 154 (1973) (finding that the mother’s “right of personal privacy includes 
the abortion decision”).
46 410 U.S. 179 (1973).
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criminalizing the procurement of an abortion unless the procedure was 
necessary to save the mother’s life.47  The Court’s threshold consideration was 
whether fetuses are entitled to protection under the Fourteenth Amendment, 
which provides that “persons” cannot be deprived of life without due process 
of law.  Justice Blackmun, writing for a 7-2 majority, held that the term 
“persons” in the Fourteenth Amendment does not include the unborn.48  He 
explained that “the unborn have never been recognized in the law as persons in 
the whole sense,” and that, except for abortion regulations, “the law has been 
reluctant to endorse any theory that life, as we recognize it, begins before live 
birth.”49  Because fetuses are not constitutional persons under the Fourteenth 
Amendment, the Court continued, states are not constitutionally obligated to 
protect fetuses.50  Had the Court held that fetuses were constitutional persons, 
at least some of the abortion regulations struck down in Roe and Doe would 
have been upheld.51
The subordination of fetuses to maternal liberty is further reflected in the 
Supreme Court’s recognition of a constitutional right to abortion.  Roe and Doe
hold that the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment guarantees a 
woman’s right to choose an abortion,52 and this interpretation has been 
affirmed by the Court on numerous occasions over the past 35 years.53  Two 
guiding principles have emerged from the Court’s abortion jurisprudence.  
First, a woman has the right to choose to have an abortion before fetal viability 
47 See Roe, 410 U.S. at 117-18 (referencing the Texas State Penal Code that “make[s] it a 
crime to ‘procure an abortion,’ . . . except with respect to ‘an abortion procured or attempted 
by medical advice for the purpose of saving the life of the mother’”).
48 Id. at 158.
49 Id. at 161-62.
50 But see id. at 154 (providing that a government may, under narrow circumstances, 
regulate abortion in order to protect “potential [human] life” and safeguard medical 
standards); Gonzales v. Carhart, 127 S. Ct. 1610, 1632-35 (2007) (discussing the 
government’s interest in fetal life and holding that it justifies a ban on the so-called “dilation 
and evacuation” method of abortion).
51 See Roe, 410 U.S. at 157 n.54 (suggesting that the Texas abortion ban would have 
been upheld if “the fetus . . . [were] a person who . . . [was] not to be deprived of life 
without due process of law”); Doe, 410 U.S. at 189 (“What is said [in Roe] is applicable 
here, and need not be repeated.”); Balkin, supra note 7, at 843.
52 Roe, 410 U.S. at 153; Doe, 410 U.S. at 189.
53 See, e.g., Carhart, 127 S. Ct. at 1626; Planned Parenthood of Se. Pa. v. Casey, 505 
U.S. 833, 851 (1992) (musing that the right to liberty, which includes the right to terminate 
one’s pregnancy, includes the freedom “to define one’s own concept of existence, of 
meaning, of the universe, and of the mystery of human life”).  It is notable that this is not the 
right to define another’s existence.  In short, the mother’s right is not one to grant or deny 
“personhood” status to the fetus in her womb, but rather to determine whether to terminate 
her pregnancy.  Id. at 853 (framing the issue as “[t]he extent to which the legislatures of the 
States might act to outweigh the interests of the woman in choosing to terminate her 
pregnancy”).
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and to obtain it without undue interference from the government.54  Second, 
the government has the power to restrict abortions after viability, if the law 
contains exceptions for pregnancies endangering the woman’s life or health.55  
The Court has explained that the term “health” should be interpreted broadly to 
encompass a mother’s physical, mental, and emotional well-being.56  And so it 
is clear that a hierarchy of rights has been formed by the Supreme Court: The 
mother’s right to an abortion trumps the rights of pre-viable fetuses under all 
circumstances, and the rights of viable fetuses whenever the mother’s health, 
liberally construed, is in jeopardy.57  While government is deemed to have a 
legitimate interest in protecting fetal life,58 this interest, as a practical matter, is 
regularly outweighed by the mother’s constitutional right to choose an 
abortion.59  
Peering beyond constitutional doctrine, one finds that statutory law also
subordinates the rights of fetuses.  This is evinced most clearly by the maternal 
safe harbors written into the various laws protecting fetal life.  Many states, for 
example, explicitly exempt the fetus's mother from the prosecution of laws 
banning certain types of late-term abortions.60  Along these same lines, the 
54 Casey, 505 U.S. at 876-77 (adopting the “undue burden” standard and defining “undue 
burden” as a regulation that “has the purpose or effect of placing a substantial obstacle in the 
path of a woman seeking an abortion of a nonviable fetus”); id. at 846 (finding that the 
state’s interest in protecting fetal life is insufficiently strong before viability).
55 Roe, 410 U.S. at 164-65 (finding that after viability, the state may “regulate, and even 
proscribe, abortion except where it is necessary, in appropriate medical judgment, for the 
preservation of the life or health of the mother”).  This Article will refer to abortions that are 
necessary to preserve a woman’s health as “therapeutic” abortions.
56 See Doe v. Bolton, 410 U.S. 179, 191-92 (1973) (finding that a physician may 
consider not only physical factors but also emotional and psychological factors when 
determining if the preservation of the woman’s health justifies an abortion).
57 Professor Balkin contends that the constitutional right to abortion is composed of two 
distinct rights: the right to not be forced by the State to bear children at risk to her life or 
health and the right to not be forced by the state to become a mother and thus take on the 
responsibilities of motherhood.  Jack Balkin, Abortion and Original Meaning 5 (Yale Law 
Sch., Research Paper No. 128), available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.
cfm?abstract_id=925558#PaperDownload.
58 See Carhart, 127 S. Ct. at 1633 (“Congress could . . . conclude that the type of 
abortion proscribed by the Act requires specific regulation because it implicates additional 
ethical and moral concerns that justify a special prohibition.”); Casey, 505 U.S. at 846 
(discussing Pennsylvania’s right to protect “the life of the fetus that may become a child”).
59 The traditional example concerns the woman who is pregnant with a viable fetus yet 
who lacks a health justification to override the state’s interest in protecting fetal life.  See, 
e.g., Stenberg v. Carhart, 530 U.S. 914, 921 (2000) (quoting Roe, 410 U.S. at 164-65) 
(observing that states may regulate or proscribe post-viability abortions except where 
abortion is medically necessary to preserve the mother’s life or health).
60 See, e.g., ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 13-3603 (2001) (punishing the person that procures 
the miscarriage of the woman); ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 22, § 1598 (2004) (penalizing the 
person who performs an illegal abortion but not the mother); TENN. CODE ANN. § 39-15-201 
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large majority of fetal-homicide laws include safe harbor provisions for acts
committed by the fetus's mother.61  These provisions, it seems, would 
encompass acts outside of the abortion context such as the ingestion of illicit 
drugs.62
After juxtaposing the growing legal recognition of fetuses with the mother’s 
right to an abortion, the contours of the current fetal-rights scheme can be 
summarized as follows: (1) fetuses at all stages of gestation are unique human 
beings;63 (2) the unlawful killing of fetuses is classified and punished similarly 
(2003) (criminalizing the conduct of those performing illegal abortions or procuring
miscarriages); 1 AM. JUR. 2D Abortion and Birth Control § 118 (2005) (“Statutes defining 
abortion usually are directed only against the person or persons who commit or attempt to 
commit the act rather than against the woman upon whom the act is committed, 
notwithstanding it may be done with her knowledge and consent.  As a general rule, she 
incurs no criminal liability.”).
61 See ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 13-1103(B) (Supp. 2006) (exempting the mother from 
prosecution for illegal abortions); ARK. CODE ANN. § 5-1-102(13)(B)(iii) (2006) (same); 
FLA. STAT. ANN. § 782.09(1) (West 2007) (same); GA. CODE ANN. § 16-5-80(f) (Supp. 
2006) (same); IDAHO CODE ANN. § 18-4016(2) (2004) (same); 720 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN.
5/9-3.2(c) (West 2002) (same); IOWA CODE ANN. § 707.8(12) (West 2003) (same); KY. REV.
STAT. ANN. § 507A.010(3) (LexisNexis Supp. 2006) (same); LA. REV. STAT. ANN.
§ 14:32.5(A) (2007) (same); MD. CODE ANN., CRIM. LAW § 2-103(f) (LexisNexis Supp. 
2006) (same); MINN. STAT. ANN. § 609.266(b) (West 2003) (same); NEB. REV. STAT. § 28-
390 (Supp. 2006) (same); N.D. CENT. CODE § 12.1-17.1-01(2) (1997) (same); OHIO REV.
CODE ANN. § 2903.09(C) (LexisNexis 2006) (same); OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 21, § 652(E) 
(West Supp. 2007) (same); 18 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 2608(a) (West 1998) (same); TEX.
PENAL CODE ANN. §§ 19.06, 22.12, 49.12 (Vernon Supp. 2006) (same); TEX. CIV. PRAC. &
REM. CODE ANN. § 71.003(c) (Vernon Supp. 2006) (same); W. VA. CODE ANN. § 61-2-
30(d)(5) (LexisNexis 2005) (same); WIS. STAT. ANN. § 939.75(2)(b)(3) (West 2005) (same).
62 See, e.g., 18 U.S.C. § 1841(c) (Supp. IV 2004) (stating that the UVVA shall not “be 
construed to permit the prosecution . . . of any woman with respect to her unborn child”); 
KY. REV. STAT. ANN. § 507A.010(3) (LexisNexis Supp. 2006) (“Nothing in this chapter 
shall apply to any acts of a pregnant woman that caused the death of her unborn child.”); 
TEX. PENAL CODE ANN. §§ 19.06, 22.12, 49.12 (Vernon Supp. 2006) (exempting from its 
wrongful death statute “conduct committed by the mother of the unborn child”); TEX. CIV.
PRAC. & REM. CODE ANN. § 71.003(c) (Vernon Supp. 2006) (same).  While all jurisdictions 
prohibit certain types of drug use, and these laws apply with equal force to pregnant women, 
the safe harbor provisions in fetal-homicide laws ensure that a pregnant woman will not be 
punished for the harm her illicit drug use caused to the fetus in her womb.  See, e.g., State v. 
Deborah J. Z., 596 N.W.2d 490, 494 n.5 (Wis. Ct. App. 1999) (indicating that only one state 
court of last appeal has held that maternal drug use during pregnancy can result in criminal 
prosecution and conviction for the harm caused to her fetus).
63 This Article proceeds under the assumption that society identifies the uniqueness of 
the unborn upon conception.  Of the thirty-six states that apply homicide laws to the unborn, 
a substantial majority (twenty-four) apply this conception-based framework.  Other vesting 
points include nine weeks (1 jurisdiction), twelve weeks (1), quickening (3), viability (5), 
and twenty-four weeks (2).  It is also notable that Congress follows the majority position 
and recognizes uniqueness at conception.  Lastly, the conception framework seems to have 
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to the unlawful killing of born humans; (3) mothers can procure nontherapeutic 
abortions prior to fetal viability; (4) mothers can procure therapeutic abortions 
at any stage of fetal gestation; and (5) mothers cannot be prosecuted for 
harming fetuses in their wombs.  The following Sections examine this 
bifurcated scheme, taken in its whole, and describe how it has been endorsed 
by our societal institutions.
C. Institutional Support for the Bifurcated Fetal-Rights Scheme
The bifurcated fetal-rights scheme enjoys broad support within our societal 
institutions.  This institutional support is best demonstrated by examining 
judicial accommodation of fetal statutory rights and, conversely, legislative
respect for maternal constitutional liberty.  
In the wake of Roe, courts have been willing to tailor the constitutional right 
to abortion to permit governments to make certain value judgments on the 
personhood status of fetuses.  The signature case in this regard is Webster v. 
Reproductive Health Services.64  In Webster, the Supreme Court reviewed the 
constitutionality of a Missouri statute that declared in its preamble “that ‘[t]he 
life of each human being begins at conception,’ and that ‘unborn children have 
protectable interests in life, health, and well-being.’”65  The Supreme Court 
upheld the law on the grounds that “the preamble does not by its terms regulate 
abortion” and that the underlying statute offered no more protections to unborn 
children than otherwise afforded by tort and probate law, which is permissible 
under Roe.66  The Court explained that Roe “implies no limitation on the 
authority of a State to make a value judgment favoring childbirth over 
abortion.”67  Webster makes clear that a woman’s constitutional right to 
abortion does not encompass a right to preclude the government from defining
the fetus in her womb as a “person.”
significant momentum within the states, as it was adopted by four states in last year alone 
(Alabama, Alaska, Nebraska, and South Carolina).  If the contour were alternatively placed 
at some later point of gestation (such as quickening), the bifurcated rights-scheme, as 
discussed infra in Part III, would of course still exist.  In such a case, however, it would only 
extend to fetuses that had developed beyond the chosen gestation point.
64 492 U.S. 490 (1989).
65 Id. at 501 (alteration in original) (quoting MO. REV. STAT. § 1.205.1(1)-(2) (1986)).  
The preamble of the statute also stated that, to the extent permissible by the Constitution, 
“the unborn child at every stage of development [is entitled to] all the rights, privileges, and 
immunities available to other persons, citizens, and residents of this state.”  Id. at 504 n.4 
(quoting MO. REV. STAT. § 1.205.2 (1986)).
66 Id. at 506.  The Eighth Circuit had declared the law unconstitutional, reasoning that the 
preamble constituted “‘an impermissible state adoption of a theory of when life begins.’”  
Id. at 570 (Stevens, J., dissenting) (quoting Reprod. Health Servs. v. Webster, 851 F.2d 
1071, 1076 (8th Cir. 1988)).
67 Id. at 506 (quoting Maher v. Roe, 432 U.S. 464, 474 (1977)).
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Since Webster, criminal defendants and advocacy groups have mounted 
various constitutional challenges to fetal-homicide laws.  Each one of them has 
failed.  In one such case, the Supreme Court of California held that “when the 
mother’s privacy interests are not at stake, the Legislature may determine 
whether, and at what point, it should protect life inside a mother’s womb from 
homicide.”68  The Missouri Court of Appeals similarly stated that “[t]he fact 
that a mother of a pre-born child may have been granted certain legal rights to 
terminate the pregnancy does not preclude the prosecution of a third party for 
murder in the case of a killing of a child not consented to by the mother.”69  
And the Minnesota Supreme Court, in dismissing a defendant’s equal 
protection claim, wrote that “Roe v. Wade . . . does not protect, much less 
confer on an assailant, a third-party unilateral right to destroy the fetus.”70  
Following the example of Webster, courts have uniformly permitted 
legislatures to make value judgments on the personhood status of fetuses so 
long as the mother’s right to exercise abortion rights is not obstructed.
The institutional legitimacy of the fetal-rights scheme is further
demonstrated by legislative respect for maternal liberty.  As described above, 
many fetal-homicide laws include a maternal safe harbor provision which 
explicitly prohibits prosecution of the mother for any acts that harm her fetus.  
Professor Carolyn Ramsey recently observed that, as a result of these safe 
harbors, fetal-homicide laws “do not provide an effective launching pad for an 
assault on Roe.”71  And even leading proponents of the right-to-life position 
have conceded that, as a result of this exemption, fetal-homicide laws do not 
infringe on abortion rights.  During the UVVA debate, Senator Rick Santorum 
stated unequivocally that the right to an abortion was not at stake.72  And the 
National Right to Life Committee explained, “[u]nborn victims laws do not 
affect legal abortion, but they do allow justice to be done for unborn babies 
whose lives are snuffed out by the actions of violent criminals, and for the 
parents and grandparents of such victims.”73
68 People v. Davis, 872 P.2d 591, 599 (Cal. 1994).
69 State v. Holcomb, 956 S.W.2d 286, 291 (Mo. Ct. App. 1997).
70 State v. Merrill, 450 N.W.2d 318, 322 (Minn. 1990); State v. Alfieri, 724 N.E.2d 477, 
483 (Ohio Ct. App. 1998) (explaining that, even under Roe, “there has never been any 
notion that a third party . . . has a fundamental liberty interest in terminating another’s 
pregnancy” (quoting State v. Coleman, 705 N.E.2d 419, 421 (Ohio Ct. App. 1997))); 
Commonwealth v. Wilcott, 86 ERIE COUNTY LEGAL J. 1, 14-16 (Pa. Ct. Com. Pl. Jan. 24, 
2003) (rejecting a challenge that the Pennsylvania Crimes Against Unborn Children Act 
violates Roe and its progeny because it criminalizes the killing of a fetus from the point of 
conception, since Roe also protects the right of a mother “to carry her child to term”).
71 Ramsey, supra note 4, at 725; see also supra note 61 and accompanying text.
72 150 CONG. REC. S3136 (daily ed. Mar. 25, 2004) (statement of Sen. Santorum) (stating 
that the UVVA “has nothing to do with abortion”).
73 Letter from Douglas Johnson, Legis. Dir., Nat’l Right to Life Comm., to the U.S. 
Senate (Feb. 1, 2004), available at http://www.nrlc.org/Unborn_Victims/
Senateletter020104.pdf.
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Judicial accommodation of fetal rights and legislative respect for maternal 
liberty suggest widespread institutional endorsement of the bifurcated fetal-
rights scheme.  Moreover, public opinion polls show that Americans indeed 
support this balance struck by their judicial and legislative institutions.74  
While structural and popular endorsements are certainly suggestive of a 
societal consensus, they do not, of course, ensure the stability of that consensus
over time.  To get a better sense of the scheme’s potential chasms, the next 
Section briefly surveys the leading attacks against the bifurcated fetal-rights 
scheme.
D. Criticism of the Bifurcated Fetal-Rights Scheme
Despite a coalition of institutional support for the bifurcated fetal-rights 
scheme, there are outspoken critics on both sides of the abortion issue who 
view the scheme as flawed and ultimately unsustainable.  For example, in 
1999, five years before the UVVA was signed into law, the National Abortion 
and Reproductive Rights Action League warned that a federal fetal-homicide 
law would “‘forge new legal ground that would eventually undermine’ the Roe 
vs. Wade decision.”75  And the ACLU argued that the UVVA would “separate 
the woman from her fetus in the eyes of the law.  Such separation is merely the 
first step toward eroding a woman’s right to determine the fate of her own 
pregnancy and to direct the course of her own health care.”76  During the 
UVVA floor debate, pro-choice members of Congress issued ominous 
warnings.  Senator Russ Feingold stated that “by recognizing the fetus as an 
entity against which a separate crime can be committed, the Unborn Victims of 
Violence Act may undermine women’s reproductive rights as set forth by the 
Supreme Court in Roe v. Wade.”77  And Senator Dianne Feinstein predicted 
74 See Ramsey, supra note 4, at 734 (stating that fetal-homicide laws tend to “track the 
middle ground of public opinion”); Roper Ctr. for Pub. Opinion Research, ABC News Poll, 
Question ID: USABC.090605 R29 (Sept. 6, 2005), available at LexisNexis, Public Opinion 
Online, Acc-No. 1633001 (sixty percent of those polled want the Roberts Court to uphold 
Roe); Roper Ctr. for Pub. Opinion Research, CBS News Poll, Question ID: USCBS.080405 
R56 (Aug. 4, 2005), available at LexisNexis, Public Opinion Online, Acc-No. 1631372 
(noting that sixty percent of those polled described the Roe decision as a “good thing”); see 
also H.R. REP. NO. 108-420, pt. 1, at 5 (2004) (observing that “84% of Americans believe 
that prosecutors should be able to bring a homicide charge on behalf of an unborn child 
killed in the womb” by someone other than the pregnant woman or an abortion provider).
75 House Votes To Make Hurting Fetus a Crime, DESERET MORNING NEWS (Salt Lake 
City), Oct. 1, 1999, at A2 (quoting Kate Michelman, President of the National Abortion and 
Reproductive Rights Action League).
76 Memorandum from the ACLU Wash., D.C., Nat’l Office to Interested Persons on 
Attempts to Create Fetal Rights: The Unborn Victims of Violence Act of 2003 (S. 1019/S. 
146, H.R. 1997) (June 17, 2003), http://www.aclu.org/reproductiverights/
fetalrights/12535leg20030617.html.
77 150 CONG. REC. S3149 (daily ed. Mar. 25, 2004) (statement of Sen. Feingold).  R. Alta 
Charo, Warren P. Knowles Professor of Law and Bioethics at the University of Wisconsin, 
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that “the language in the bill will clearly place into federal law a definition of 
life that will chip away at the right to choose as outlined in Roe v. Wade.”78  
Similarly, in the House debate, Representative Zoe Lofgren observed that the 
“underlying intent” of the UVVA was to make “American women . . . give up 
their [reproductive] freedom in order to get protection from violence.”79
On the pro-life side of the issue, Senator Orrin Hatch responded to pro-
choice criticism of the UVVA by observing: “‘They say it undermines abortion 
rights.  It does undermine it. . . . But that’s irrelevant.’”80  Representative Ron 
Paul, a strident proponent of fetal rights,81 complained during a House of 
Representatives debate in 2001 that fetal-homicide legislation employs
the odd legal philosophy that an abortionist with full knowledge of his 
terminal act is not subject to prosecution while an aggressor acting 
without knowledge of the child’s existence is subject to nearly the full 
penalty of the law. . . . It is becoming more and more difficult for 
congress [sic] and the courts to pass the smell test as government 
simultaneously treats the unborn as a person in some instances and as a 
non-person in others.82
The fervent concerns of certain legislators, advocacy groups, and 
commentators – on both sides of the abortion issue – raise a genuine issue as to 
whether the bifurcated fetal-rights scheme can be sustained over the coming 
decades.  Due to the substantial liberties at stake, their warnings cannot simply 
be ignored out of hand.  The remainder of this Article therefore seeks to 
address the following questions: First, do fetal-homicide laws reflect a societal 
understanding that a fetus is a “person”?  And, second, is fetal “personhood” 
incompatible with the right to abortion?  To better inform the debate on these 
issues, this Article turns to the work of John Rawls, whose ideas are often 
regarded as the central starting point for discussions of justice.
submitted the following statement to the Senate: “If you can get enough of these bricks in 
place, draw enough examples from different parts of life and law where embryos are treated 
as babies, then how can the Supreme Court say they’re not?”  Id. at 3127 (statement of Sen. 
Feinstein) (internal quotation marks omitted).
78 Id. at 3126 (statement of Sen. Feinstein).  Senator Feinstein further warned that the 
UVVA’s definition of homo sapiens “will be the first step in removing a woman’s right to 
choice.”  Id.  She explained: “[O]nce declared legally, that law becomes the stepping-stone 
to refuse embryonic stem cell research and to ban abortion.  Once the law defines human 
life as beginning at conception, stem cell research could become murder, abortion becomes 
murder, even in the first days of a pregnancy.”  Id. at 3127.
79 150 CONG. REC. H665 (daily ed. Feb. 26, 2004) (statement of Rep. Lofgren).
80 Kate Snow, Laci Peterson Family Endorses “Unborn Victims” Bill, CNN.COM, May 
8, 2003, http://www.cnn.com/2003/ALLPOLITICS/05/07/laci.bill (quoting Sen. Hatch).
81 See, e.g., Ron Paul, Pro-Life Action Must Originate from Principle, 
LEWROCKWELL.COM, June 4, 2003, http://www.lewrockwell.com/paul/paul100.html (“I 
have long been concerned with the rights of unborn people.”).
82 147 CONG. REC. 6326 (2001) (statement of Rep. Paul).
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II. RAWLS’S POLITICAL PHILOSOPHY
John Rawls is widely regarded as the most distinguished moral and political 
philosopher of our past century.83  His seminal work, A Theory of Justice, 
published in 1971, introduced to the world his unique methodology for framing 
issues of distributive justice.84  Rawls’s conception of justice, which he named
“justice as fairness,”85 revived interest in many of the substantive questions of 
political philosophy, and has had a lasting impact in modern scholarship as a 
whole.86  Later in his career, Rawls turned his attention to issues of political 
stability.  His work in this area culminated with the publication of Political 
Liberalism in 1993.87  In the last years of his life, Rawls strived to integrate the
ideas from A Theory of Justice and Political Liberalism into a unified 
philosophical framework of justice and stability.88
Taking Rawls’s writings in their entirety, it is virtually impossible to know 
how he understood the morality or political implications of juxtaposing fetal-
homicide laws with abortion.  His work, for instance, never references the 
potential implications of a societal recognition of fetal personhood.  And in the 
two brief passages in which he does discuss the right to abortion, one quickly 
realizes that he was agnostic regarding the inherent fairness of the procedure.  
On the one hand, Rawls wrote the following in a note to Political Liberalism:
Now I believe any reasonable balance of [the values of due respect for 
human life, ordered reproduction of political society over time, and the 
equality of women as equal citizens] will give a woman a duly qualified 
right to decide whether or not to end her pregnancy during the first 
trimester.  The reason for this is that at this early stage of pregnancy the 
83 Nussbaum, supra note 10; accord Ben Rogers, The Good Life, NEW STATESMAN, Sept. 
20, 1999, at 55 (reviewing JOHN RAWLS, JOHN RAWLS: COLLECTED PAPERS, supra note 11) 
(“[Rawls] is now often said to be the most important political philosopher of the century in 
any language.”).
84 See generally JOHN RAWLS, A THEORY OF JUSTICE (rev. ed. 1999) [hereinafter RAWLS,
THEORY OF JUSTICE].
85 Id. at 3.  Despite having made “a number of important revisions” to the 1971 edition, 
Rawls contends that he “still accept[s] its main outlines and defend[s] its central doctrines.”  
Id. at xi.
86 See Nussbaum, supra note 10 (“The ideas took hold through their own power, 
decisively shifting the climate of debate not only in philosophy but also in such fields as 
economics, law, and public policy. . . . Thirty years after publication of A Theory of Justice, 
with all the discussion of rights and pluralism that has ensued, it is easy to forget that a 
whole generation of our political and moral philosophers had virtually stopped talking about 
that idea . . . .”).
87 See generally JOHN RAWLS, POLITICAL LIBERALISM (1993).
88 See RAWLS, RESTATEMENT, supra note 14, at xv (“The other aim [of this book] is to 
connect into one unified statement the conception of justice presented in Theory [of Justice] 
and the main ideas found in my essays beginning with 1974.”).
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political value of the equality of women is overriding, and this right is 
required to give it substance and force.89
And on the other hand, Rawls later wrote in response to comments on that 
note:
Some have quite naturally read the footnote in Political Liberalism . . . as 
an argument for the right to abortion in the first trimester.  I do not intend 
it to be one. . . . I don’t say the most reasonable or decisive argument; I 
don’t know what that would be, or even if it exists.90
The mere fact that Rawls did not stake out a clear position on the issue of 
abortion does not, of course, mean that his philosophical model is unhelpful to 
the matter before us.  For the legacy of Rawls is, to be sure, not a laundry list 
of “just” policies, but rather it is a unique theoretical approach to describe and 
evaluate the justness of policy determinations as they shift over time.  The 
following paragraphs set forth Rawls’s views on justice and explain how they 
can assist us in our efforts to measure the stability of the bifurcated fetal-rights 
scheme.
A. Rawls’s Philosophy
Rawls’s political philosophy evolved over the course of his career,91 and, in 
its final form, claimed that pluralistic societies are well-ordered when their 
societal judgments accord with those principles of justice implicated by a 
shared political conception of justice.92  Rawls argued that a particular political 
89 JOHN RAWLS, The Idea of Public Reason (Feb.–Mar. 1990), in POLITICAL LIBERALISM, 
supra note 87, 212, 243 n.32 [hereinafter RAWLS, Public Reason].
90 RAWLS, Public Reason Revisited, supra note 11, at 605 n.80; see also Jeremy Waldron, 
The Plight of the Poor in the Midst of Plenty, LONDON REV. BOOKS, July 15, 1999, at 6 
(reviewing JOHN RAWLS, JOHN RAWLS: COLLECTED PAPERS, supra note 11) (discussing 
Rawls’s ambiguous public statements regarding the justness of abortion).  In contrast, one 
commentator has observed: 
It is sobering to observe that even in the hands of a careful and high-minded thinker 
such as Rawls, the appeal to public reason can serve to highhandedly deny the reality 
of competing goods and tragic choices and intractable questions – to disguise, in other 
words, reason’s limits.  The master’s lapse dramatizes how readily partisan 
intellectuals might arrogate public reason and, thus armed, use it in the heat of public 
debate to dispense with reason, cut off discussion, shut down questioning, and stop the 
inquiring mind dead in its tracks. . . . [I]n the end it is less that Rawls is confused than 
that his conscientious philosophical investigations lead him to keep bumping up against 
fundamental tensions in the liberal spirit.
Peter Berkowitz, John Rawls and the Liberal Faith, WILSON Q., Spring 2002, at 60, 66-68.
91 See RAWLS, RESTATEMENT, supra note 14, at xv-xvi.
92 See JOHN RAWLS, The Idea of an Overlapping Consensus (1987), in POLITICAL 
LIBERALISM, supra note 87, at 133, 134 [hereinafter RAWLS, Overlapping Consensus].
Rawls’s “pluralism” should be distinguished from that of Isaiah Berlin.  As Charles Lamore
put it:
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conception – his own ideal of “justice as fairness” – was in fact best suited to 
generate a public consensus in pluralistic societies.  The following Sections
outline the core components of his writings, namely: the original position, 
principles of justice, the public domain, and reflective equilibrium.
1. The Original Position
Building on a rich tradition of political philosophy (most notably the 
writings of Locke, Rousseau, and Kant), Rawls’s model of justice is founded 
on a contractarian theory.93  His starting point is the “original position,” a 
hypothetical place where parties choose together, in one joint act, a system of 
justice to govern society’s basic institutions.94  The original position is 
analogous to the “state of nature” in traditional theories of social contract.95  
The parties at the original position constitute rational agents acting on behalf of 
all “those who could take part in the initial agreement, were it not for fortuitous 
circumstances.”96  This constituency includes those with (1) the capacity for a 
sense of justice and (2) the capacity for a conception of the good.97
A central tenet of the original position is that agents select their system of 
justice from behind a “veil of ignorance.”98  The objective of the veil is to 
Berlin’s pluralism is a positive doctrine according to which there are many ultimate, 
irreducible, and sometimes incompatible ends of life.  The pluralism Rawls has in mind 
might be better described as the existence of reasonable disagreement about the nature 
of the human good (Berlin’s value-pluralism being one of the views in dispute).
Charles Lamore, Public Reason, in THE CAMBRIDGE COMPANION TO RAWLS 368, 392 n.8 
(Samuel Freeman ed., 2003).
93 See RAWLS, THEORY OF JUSTICE, supra note 84, at 10; see also RAWLS, Public Reason, 
supra note 89, at 217 (explaining that government coercion is only legitimate when 
“exercised in accordance with a constitution the essentials of which all citizens may 
reasonably be expected to endorse in the light of principles and ideals acceptable to them as 
reasonable and rational”).
94 RAWLS, THEORY OF JUSTICE, supra note 84, at 10-11.
95 Id. at 11; cf. Berkowitz, supra note 90, at 64 (“Rawls himself sometimes notes . . . that 
the original position is not a point of departure for discovering morality’s premises so much 
as a formulation of them and a means for sketching out some of their most basic practical 
implications.”).
96 RAWLS, THEORY OF JUSTICE, supra note 84, at 446.
97 RAWLS, RESTATEMENT, supra note 14, at 19-20.
98 RAWLS, THEORY OF JUSTICE, supra note 84, at 11 (“Among the essential features of 
this situation is that no one knows his place in society, his class position or social status . . . . 
The principles of justice are chosen behind a veil of ignorance.”).  The concept of the “veil 
of ignorance” was first devised by John Harsanyi in 1953.  See John C. Harsanyi, Cardinal 
Utility in Welfare Economics and in the Theory of Risk-Taking, 61 J. POL. ECON. 434, 434-
35 (“Now, a value judgment on the distribution of income would show the required 
impersonality to the highest degree if the person who made this judgment had to choose a 
particular income distribution in complete ignorance of what his own relative position . . .
would be within the system chosen.”).  Rawls and Harsanyi, however, came to very 
different conclusions about how humans behave behind the veil.  Compare RAWLS, THEORY 
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counter each party’s potential for bias during the selection process,99 thereby 
creating the fundamental fairness of conditions necessary for a just and 
pluralistic society to emerge through the mechanism of a social contract.100  It 
thereby conceals what Rawls referred to as politically irrelevant information, 
which includes one’s race, gender, intelligence, family, social position, and –
importantly – one’s own notions of a moral, religious, or philosophical 
good.101  “By situating the parties symmetrically, the original position respects 
the basic precept of formal equality, or Sidgwick’s principle of equity: those 
similar in all relevant respects are to be treated similarly.”102
OF JUSTICE, supra note 84, at 278 (arguing that “one of the chief aims of justice as fairness is 
to construct an alternative to the classical utilitarian doctrine”), with JOHN E. ROEMER,
THEORIES OF DISTRIBUTIVE JUSTICE 5 (1996) (“Harsanyi purported to show that 
utilitarianism would emerge from the contemplation of souls behind a veil of ignorance.”).
99 RAWLS, THEORY OF JUSTICE, supra note 84, at 118 (explaining that the veil of 
ignorance seeks to “nullify the effects of specific contingencies which put men at odds and 
tempt them to exploit social and natural circumstances to their own advantage”).
100 See RAWLS, RESTATEMENT, supra note 14, at 18 (discussing the fairness of bargaining 
conditions in the original position); JOHN RAWLS, The Law of Peoples, in JOHN RAWLS:
COLLECTED PAPERS, supra note 11, at 529, 538 (stating the essential condition that “the 
original position represents the parties (or citizens) fairly, or reasonably”).  Notably, when 
placed behind a veil, agents will rarely disagree on the governing conception; thus, 
conceptions are chosen, rather than bargained for, at the original position.  See RAWLS,
THEORY OF JUSTICE, supra note 84, at 119.
101 JOHN RAWLS, The Powers of Citizens and Their Representation (April 1980), in 
POLITICAL LIBERALISM, supra note 87, at 47, 79 (1993) [hereinafter RAWLS, Powers of 
Citizens] (“Features relating to social position, native endowment, and historical accident, as 
well as the content of persons’ determinate conceptions of the good, are irrelevant, 
politically speaking, and hence placed behind the veil of ignorance.”); RAWLS,
RESTATEMENT, supra note 14, at 15 (“In the original position, the parties are not allowed to 
know the social positions or the particular comprehensive doctrines of the persons they 
represent.”).  In addition to concealing the ultimate personal characteristics and beliefs of 
the agents, the veil ensures that agents lack information to assess the probabilities as to who 
they might be beyond the veil.  See id. at 98 (“[P]arties have no reliable basis for estimating 
the probabilities of the possible social circumstances that affect the fundamental interests of 
the persons they represent.”).
102 RAWLS, RESTATEMENT, supra note 14, at 87; accord RAWLS, THEORY OF JUSTICE,
supra note 84, at 118 (“[Parties] do not know how the various alternatives will affect their 
own particular case and they are obliged to evaluate principles solely on the basis of general 
considerations.”).  This conception of equality borrows from economic theories about
human behavior where “role-reversibility” exists.  See, e.g., Francesco Parisi, The 
Formation of Customary Law 10 (George Mason Univ. Sch. of Law: Law and Econ. 
Research Paper Series, Paper No. 01-06, 2001), available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/
papers.cfm?abstract_id=262032 (“Similar to a Rawlsian veil of ignorance, role reversibility 
and stochastic symmetry induce each member to agree to a set of rules that benefits the 
entire group, thus maximizing her expected share of the wealth.”).
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Although personal and political information is placed behind the veil, Rawls 
was unequivocal that agents at the original position have access “to the same 
body of general facts . . . and to the same information about the general 
circumstances of society.”103  They know, for example, that they will 
invariably possess certain traits and hold certain beliefs within a diverse and 
pluralistic society.104  Rawls instructed that from this general knowledge the 
agents will identify a uniform set of “primary goods,” which are what free and 
equal persons need as citizens.105  These primary goods constitute those “social 
conditions and all-purpose means that are generally necessary to enable 
citizens adequately to develop and fully exercise their two moral powers, and 
to pursue their determinate conceptions of the good.”106  In Rawls’s 
contractarian model, a common interest in preserving primary goods allows the 
parties to reach an agreement on a single political “conception of justice.”107  
The chosen conception is the one which, from a menu of all plausible 
conceptions, appears to offer the best protection of the primary goods.108  
103 RAWLS, RESTATEMENT, supra note 14, at 87.
104 See RAWLS, THEORY OF JUSTICE, supra note 84, at 119 (“It is taken for granted, 
however, that [parties in the original position] know the general facts about human society.  
They understand political affairs and the principles of economic theory; they know the basis 
of social organization and the laws of human psychology.  Indeed the parties are presumed 
to know whatever general facts affect the choice of the principles of justice.”).
105 See RAWLS, RESTATEMENT, supra note 14, at 58.  Prominent among these goods are 
freedom of movement, freedom of thought and liberty of conscience, freedom of the person 
and political liberty.  See id. at 58-59.
106 Id. at 57.  
107 Id. at 60 (“Primary goods, then, are what free and equal persons . . . need as
citizens. . . . [S]ome conceptions of the good are indispensable for any account of justice, 
political or other.”); see JOHN RAWLS, Fundamental Ideas (April 1980), in POLITICAL 
LIBERALISM, supra note 87, at 3, 10 [hereinafter RAWLS, Fundamental Ideas] (explaining 
that a political conception of justice seeks support from these doctrines and how, despite 
differences within the doctrines, citizens “can still maintain a just and stable democratic 
society”); RAWLS, Overlapping Consensus, supra note 92, at 134  (“Social unity is based on 
a consensus on the political conception; and stability is possible when the doctrines making 
up the consensus are affirmed by society’s politically active citizens and the requirements of 
justice are not too much in conflict with citizens’ essential interests as formed and 
encouraged by their social arrangements.”); accord Michael J. Sandel, Political Liberalism, 
107 HARV. L. REV. 1765, 1771-72 (1994) (book review) (“This means that different people 
can be persuaded to endorse liberal political arrangements, such as equal basic liberties, for 
different reasons, reflecting the various comprehensive moral and religious conceptions they 
espouse.”).
108 See RAWLS, Public Reason Revisited, supra note 11, at 581. Rawls is clear, however, 
that this menu is limited to “those political conceptions that are reasonable for a 
constitutional democratic regime.”  Id. at 585.  The general rationale is that human beings 
are risk-averse, and when faced with poor information regarding their eventual position in 
society, they will never place their basic rights in jeopardy for the benefit of the greater 
good.  Agents, for example, would not select a conception which tolerated slaves and 
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Leading conceptions include utilitarianism, classical natural rights models, and 
Rawls’s own model of “justice as fairness.”109  Rawls intimated that it was 
likely agents would ultimately settle on justice as fairness as the preferred 
conception of justice.110
2. Principles of Justice
An important component of Rawls’s model is how a political conception of 
justice, which is chosen at the original position, leads to the particular 
principles of justice which govern society.111  A political conception can 
implicate principles in two ways.  First, some principles are given by the 
conception.112  Rawls instructed that a conception thus “fixes, once and for all, 
the content of basic rights and liberties, takes those guarantees off the political 
agenda, and puts them beyond the calculus of social interests.”113  These are 
masters because they would be unwilling to risk being a slave when the veil lifted.  To 
ensure equality, agents select a conception that compensates citizens saddled with 
unfavorable, but irrelevant, traits or circumstances.  Cf. RAWLS, RESTATEMENT, supra note 
14, at 64 (discussing the “difference principle” which requires that any existing inequalities 
in society “must contribute effectively to the benefit of the least advantaged”).  But see Cass 
R. Sunstein, Hazardous Heuristics 21 (Univ. Chi. Law Sch. John M. Olin Law & Econ. (2d 
Series), Working Paper No. 165, 2002), available at
http://www.law.uchicago.edu/academics/publiclaw/resources/33.crs.hazardous.pdf  
(discussing the optimistic bias inherent in human behavior).
109 RAWLS, RESTATEMENT, supra note 14, at 9 (listing potential political conceptions of 
justice as including “a particular natural rights doctrine, or a form of utilitarianism, or justice 
as fairness”); RAWLS, Public Reason Revisited, supra note 11, at 581 (“There are . . . many 
forms of public reason specified by a family of reasonable political conceptions.  Of these, 
justice as fairness, whatever its merits, is but one.”); see also JOHN FINNIS, NATURAL LAW 
AND NATURAL RIGHTS 153 (1980) (discussing the concept of shared group norms and their 
relation to the “common good”); JOHN STUART MILL, UTILITARIANISM (George Sher ed., 
Hackett Publ’g Co. 1979) (1861).
110 See RAWLS, RESTATEMENT, supra note 14, at 61.
111 See RAWLS, THEORY OF JUSTICE, supra note 84, at 11-12. The principles of social 
justice are applied to “choos[e] among the various social arrangements which determine this 
division of advantages and for underwriting an agreement on the proper distributive shares.”  
Id. at 4.  
112 For instance, see RAWLS, Public Reason Revisited, supra note 11, at 608-09, stating:
[A]ll reasonable doctrines affirm such a society with its corresponding political 
institutions: equal basic rights and liberties for all citizens, including liberty of 
conscience and the freedom of religion.  On the other hand, comprehensive doctrines 
that cannot support such a democratic society are not reasonable.  Their principles and 
ideals do not satisfy the criterion of reciprocity, and in various ways they fail to 
establish the equal basic liberties.  As examples, consider the many fundamentalist 
religious doctrines, the doctrine of the divine right of monarchs and the various forms 
of aristocracy, and, not to be overlooked, the many instances of autocracy and 
dictatorship.
113 RAWLS, RESTATEMENT, supra note 14, at 194; see Joshua Cohen, For a Democratic 
Society, in THE CAMBRIDGE COMPANION TO RAWLS, supra note 92, at 86, 113 (“So justice as 
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the principles that all parties at the original position can agree are necessary for 
political justice;114 they tend to include, among others, freedom of religion and 
the protection of one’s physical integrity.115  Rawls points out that the 
principles embedded in the political conception of “justice as fairness” would 
include “the values of equal protection and civil liberty; fair equality and 
opportunity; social equality and reciprocity.”116
The second way a political conception implicates principles of justice is 
through the process of public reason.  Parties at the original position are 
uncertain of their ultimate position in a pluralistic society.117  As such, no 
agreement can be expected regarding certain principles (e.g., those that will be 
simultaneously valuable and offensive to differing segments of the 
population).118  Rawls suggests that principles enjoying no such consensus can 
nonetheless be legitimized, once the veil of ignorance lifts, through the process 
of public reason.119  The idea is that a principle will at least be tolerable to 
those who find it offensive if it can be defended by political values which 
fairness conceives of democratic political life as ideally guided by substantive principles of 
justice set out in advance – principles that are said to articulate the (democratic) idea of 
society as a scheme of fair cooperation among free and equal persons.”).  For criticism that 
this fixture of substantive principles does not facilitate actual political autonomy but rather 
promotes the nonviolent preservation of political stability, see Jürgen Habermas, 
Reconciliation Through the Public Use of Reason: Remarks on John Rawls’s Political 
Liberalism, 92 J. PHIL. 109, 128 (1995).
114 See RAWLS, Public Reason Revisited, supra note 11, at 581.
115 See RAWLS, RESTATEMENT, supra note 14, at 189-90.
116 Id. at 90.
117 See supra notes 98-101 and accompanying text.
118 See RAWLS, THEORY OF JUSTICE, supra note 84, at 182 (“An individual recognizing 
religious or moral obligations regards them as binding absolutely in the sense that he cannot 
qualify his fulfillment of them for the sake of greater means for promoting his other 
interests.”).
119 RAWLS, Public Reason Revisited, supra note 11, at 578 (“Thus when, on a 
constitutional essential or matter of basic justice, all appropriate government officials act 
from and follow public reason, and when all reasonable citizens think of themselves ideally 
as if they were legislators following public reason, the legal enactment expressing the 
opinion of the majority is legitimate law.”); RAWLS, RESTATEMENT, supra note 14, at 194 
(“[A]s citizens come to appreciate what a liberal conception achieves, they acquire an 
allegiance to it, an allegiance that becomes stronger over time.  They come to think it both 
reasonable and wise to affirm its principles of justice as expressing political values that, 
under the reasonably favorable conditions that make democracy possible, normally 
outweigh whatever values may oppose them.  With this we have an overlapping 
consensus.”).
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could be agreed upon by all parties at an original position.120  Rawls referred to 
this reliance on common values as “reciprocity,”121 and explained that:
A citizen engages in public reason, then, when he or she deliberates 
within a framework of what he or she sincerely regards as the most 
reasonable political conception of justice, a conception that expresses 
political values that others, as free and equal citizens might also 
reasonably be expected reasonably to endorse.122
The political values selected at the original position thereby set the 
parameters of the political discourse regarding society’s governing 
principles.123  “They include not only appropriate use of the fundamental 
concepts of judgment, inference, and evidence, but also the virtues of 
reasonableness and fair-mindedness.”124  In sum, Rawls’s model provides that 
principles of justice can be implicated by a conception of justice in one of two 
ways. They are either (1) inherent to the conception, or (2) they are the 
product of public reason founded on the values endorsed by the conception.125
120 See RAWLS, Public Reason Revisited, supra note 11, at 578 (discussing how citizens 
will come to “the most reasonable conception of political justice . . . even at the cost of their 
own interests”).
121 See id. (“The criterion of reciprocity requires that when those terms are proposed as 
the most reasonable terms of fair cooperation, those proposing them must also think it at 
least reasonable for others to accept them, as free and equal citizens, and not as dominated 
or manipulated, or under the pressure of an inferior political or social position.”).
122 Id. at 581.  Rawls goes on to state that:
Some may, of course, reject a legitimate decision, as Roman Catholics may reject a 
decision to grant a right to abortion.  They may present an argument in public reason 
for denying it and fail to win a majority. . . . [However,] [t]hey can recognize the right 
as belonging to legitimate law enacted in accordance with legitimate political 
institutions and public reason, and therefore not resist it with force.
Id. at 606 (footnote omitted).  Although Rawls uses the abortion debate as an example of 
public reason, I explain in the next Section why the resolution of the abortion issue is not
left to public reasoning when agents settle on justice as fairness as their political conception 
of justice.  
123 Id. at 584 (“Examples of political values include those mentioned in the preamble to 
the United States Constitution: a more perfect union, justice, domestic tranquillity, the 
common defense, the general welfare, and the blessings of liberty for ourselves and our 
posterity.  These include under them other values: so, for example, under justice we also 
have equal basic liberties, equality of opportunity, ideals concerning the distribution of 
income and taxation, and much else.”)  Importantly, Rawls introduced the concept of the 
“proviso.”  This idea allows for individuals holding policy views based on unreasonable 
political values to participate in public reason so long as they use acceptable values in their 
effort to persuade others.  See id. (“This requirement still allows us to introduce into 
political discussion . . . our comprehensive [moral] doctrine . . . provided that . . . we give 
properly public reasons to support the principles and policies our comprehensive doctrine is 
said to support.”). 
124 RAWLS, RESTATEMENT, supra note 14, at 91-92.
125 See RAWLS, Public Reason Revisited, supra note 11, at 581-82 (discussing the content 
of public reason).
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3. Public Domain
Principles of justice have a limited applicability in that they are confined to 
the “public domain.”  Rawls's public domain encompasses society’s “basic 
structure,”126 or, in other words, our political, social, and economic 
institutions.127  These institutions, writes Rawls, are highly determinative of the 
individual’s prospects in life – they “define men’s rights and duties and 
influence their life prospects, what they can expect to be and how well they can 
hope to do.”128  Examples of such institutions include “the legal protection of 
freedom of thought and liberty of conscience, competitive markets, private 
property in the means of production, and the monogamous family.”129
The family – an institution central to the subject of this Article – falls only 
partly within Rawls’s public domain.130 While the public domain does not 
encompass the family’s role as a locus of affection, relaxation, personal 
conflict, and support,131 it does extend to the family when it serves as a place 
for institutionalized abuse or leads to unjust desires in its members.132  Rawls 
explained that there are times when “the individual members of families [need 
protection] from other family members.”133  Accordingly, principles of justice 
can thereby require parents to respect the rights of their children, and not, for 
126 RAWLS, Public Reason, supra note 89, at 223 (writing that the principles govern “the 
basic structure of . . . political, social, and economic institutions as a unified scheme of 
social cooperation”).
127 Id. 
128 RAWLS, THEORY OF JUSTICE, supra note 84, at 6-7.  
129 Id. at 6.
130 See, e.g., RAWLS, Public Reason Revisited, supra note 11, at 597 (“[P]olitical 
principles do not apply directly to its internal life, but they do impose essential constraints 
on the family as an institution and so guarantee the basic rights and liberties, and the 
freedom and opportunities, of all its members.”). 
131 See id. at 598 (“[A]t some point society has to rely on the natural affection and 
goodwill of the mature family members.”); cf. Nussbaum, supra note 10 (“[Rawls] gives 
parents a very large measure of unqualified control over the upbringing of their children, 
even when they deny girls equal opportunity by teaching them the unequal worth of 
females.”).
132 See RAWLS, Public Reason Revisited, supra note 11, at 598 (stating that “the 
principles of justice impose constraints on the family on behalf of children who as society’s 
future citizens have basic rights as such,” and arguing that children who witness injustices 
within the family face difficulty in “acquir[ing] the political virtues required of future 
citizens in a viable democratic society”); see also Martha C. Nussbaum, Rawls and 
Feminism, in THE CAMBRIDGE COMPANION TO RAWLS, supra note 92, at 488, 504 
(“[C]hildren are simply hostages to the family in which they grow up, and their participation 
in its gendered structure is by no means voluntary.”).
133 RAWLS, Public Reason, supra note 89, at 221 n.8.  For criticism of Rawls’s treatment 
of the family, see CATHARINE A. MACKINNON, TOWARD A FEMINIST THEORY OF THE STATE 
193-94 (1989); Susan Moller Okin, Political Liberalism, Justice, and Gender, 105 ETHICS
23, 25-28 (1994). 
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example, subject them to certain forms of physical abuse or deprive them of 
essentials such as medical care.134  
4. Reflective Equilibrium
An important component of Rawls's philosophical model is that the 
conception of justice selected at the original position is only justified when it is 
consistent with society’s “considered judgments” about justice.135  Rawls 
instructed that the alignment of our conception of justice (and its implicated 
principles) with our judgments is called “reflective equilibrium.”136  “It is an 
equilibrium because at last our principles and judgments coincide; and it is 
reflective since we know to what principles our judgments conform and the 
premises of their derivation.”137  The model provides that society naturally 
brings the two into accord by working from both ends: it will either “modify 
the account of the initial situation or . . . revise [its] existing judgments.”138  By 
going back and forth, adjusting our considered judgments and principles of 
justice, we deliberately bring ourselves into reflective equilibrium.139  At this 
point, society is well-ordered according to Rawls.140
B. Gauging the Sustainability of Societal Judgments
Rawls’s political philosophy undoubtedly provides insight into the 
sustainability of certain societal judgments.  We know that a society out of 
134 RAWLS, RESTATEMENT, supra note 14, at 11.
135 See id. (discussing the definition of a “narrow reflective equilibrium”).  Considered 
judgments demand that a person: (1) Is aware of relevant facts about the issue in question; 
(2) Is able to concentrate on this question; and (3) Does not stand to gain or lose on the basis 
of the answer given.  T.M. Scanlon, Rawls on Justification, in THE CAMBRIDGE COMPANION 
TO RAWLS, supra note 92, at 139, 143.
136 See RAWLS, THEORY OF JUSTICE, supra note 84, at 18.  Rawls notes that this is an 
adaptation of Nelson Goodman’s model.  Id. at 18 n.7 (citing NELSON GOODMAN, FACT,
FICTION, AND FORECAST 65-68 (1955)).  The idea is that we should correct or revise our 
views about particular inferences we initially might think are acceptable if we come to see 
them as incompatible with rules that we generally accept and refuse to reject because they, 
in turn, best account for a broad range of other acceptable inferences.  See GOODMAN, supra, 
at 63-64.
137 RAWLS, THEORY OF JUSTICE, supra note 84, at 18.
138 Id.; see also Scanlon, supra note 135, at 149 (“But the process of seeking reflective 
equilibrium is something we each must carry out for ourselves, and it is a process of 
deciding what to think, not merely one of describing what we do think. . . . Moreover, it 
seems to me that this method, properly understood, is in fact the best way of making up 
one’s mind about moral matters and about many other subjects.”).
139 See RAWLS, THEORY OF JUSTICE, supra note 84, at 18-19.
140 Id. at 18.  Rawls described this as “a society in which (1) everyone accepts and knows 
that the others accept the same principles of justice, and (2) the basic social institutions 
generally satisfy and are generally known to satisfy these principles.”  Id. at 4.
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reflective equilibrium will naturally seek equilibrium.141  This search for 
equilibrium often causes “rogue” societal judgments to shift toward the 
principles implicated by the governing conception of justice.142  Rawls 
observed that: “When a person is presented with an intuitively appealing 
account of his sense of justice (one, say, which embodies various reasonable 
and natural presumptions), he may well revise his [societal] judgments to 
conform to its principles even though the theory does not fit his existing 
judgments exactly.”143  Rawls further emphasized that “even the judgments we 
take provisionally as fixed points are liable to revision,”144 and that “laws and 
institutions no matter how efficient and well-arranged must be reformed or 
abolished if they are unjust.”145  But it is important to recall that principles
(and, if need be, conceptions) of justice can adjust to our societal judgments.  
After all, Rawls went to pains to describe the search for reflective equilibrium 
as “alternating” and “work[ing] from both ends.”146
Because Rawls allowed for the possibility that principles and conceptions of 
justice will adjust to considered judgments,147 a Rawlsian analysis of the 
141 See id. at 18 (describing how society will match its judgments with the principles of 
justice); Scanlon, supra note 135, at 149; Waldron, supra note 90, at 3.
142 See RAWLS, THEORY OF JUSTICE, supra note 84, at 18.
143 Id. at 42-43; see also RAWLS, RESTATEMENT, supra note 14, at 30 (“When the person 
in question adopts [a] conception and brings other judgments in line with it we say this 
person is in narrow reflective equilibrium.”).
144 RAWLS, THEORY OF JUSTICE, supra note 84, at 18.
145 Id. at 3.  Rawls cites the example of the United States in the years leading up to the 
Civil War.  See RAWLS, Public Reason, supra note 89, at 249-50.  He suggested that 
American society was in reflective disequilibrium due to the emerging gulf between its 
societal judgment tolerating slavery and its principle of justice that all members of society 
are free and equal.  See id.  Ultimately, with the emancipation of slaves, the judgment 
shifted, thereby becoming more aligned with its underlying principle of justice.  See id. at 
250 (mentioning how the “political force leading to the Civil War” could be seen as an 
effort to “bring about a well-ordered and just society”).
146 RAWLS, THEORY OF JUSTICE, supra note 84, at 18 (emphasis added).
147 It is important to emphasize the distinction between judgments and considered
judgments, which are:
[Judgments] that seem clearly to be correct under conditions conducive to making good 
judgments of the relevant kind; that is, when one is fully informed about the matter in 
question, thinking carefully and clearly about it, and not subject to conflicts of interest 
or other factors that are likely to distort one’s judgment.
Scanlon, supra note 135, at 140.  While reflective equilibrium does work from two ends, 
principles (and conceptions) will only conform to considered judgments.  See RAWLS,
THEORY OF JUSTICE, supra note 84, at 42 (“[T]he principles which would be chosen in the 
original position are identical with those that match our considered judgments . . . .”).  
Regular societal judgments, on the other hand, will always conform to our principles in 
reflective equilibrium.  If the fetal-rights scheme were not deemed a considered judgment, 
there would be no need to account for the possibility that our principles might theoretically
adjust to it.  While it is possible that, due to the strong emotions involved in the debate of 
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stability of a particular judgment must ask whether there are any principles 
implicated by a reasonable conception of justice which could correspond with 
that judgment.  If there are not, then the judgment is a rogue and must, 
according to Rawls’s political model, be reformed to some degree.  
But how do we discover the principles that could be implicated by
reasonable political conceptions of justice?  It should be remembered that 
principles of justice can be derived from a conception of justice in one of two 
ways.  First, principles can be dictated by the conception.  Second, principles 
can manifest through public reason informed by the values of the conception.  
Accordingly, a two-part “sustainability” test can be distilled: a societal 
judgment is inherently unstable under Rawlsian theory if it fails to match either 
(1) principles inherent to a reasonable conception or (2) principles which 
emerge through the process of public reasoning.  The following Part applies 
this analysis to evaluate the stability of the bifurcated fetal-rights scheme.
III. THE STABILITY OF THE BIFURCATED FETAL-RIGHTS SCHEME
John Rawls’s model of justice provides us with useful information about the
bifurcated fetal-rights scheme.  The scheme, as discussed in Part I, constitutes 
a blend of strong fetal protections and abortion rights.  And we know from Part 
II that it is unstable in a Rawlsian sense if it does not correlate with a principle 
manifesting from a conception of justice that could be agreed upon at the 
original position.  The entirety of this Article considers the application of this 
sustainability test.  Section A deduces all those principles of justice that 
plausibly match the scheme.  Section B examines these “matching principles” 
and seeks to identify those original positions where parties could choose a 
conception of justice implicating such principles.  It concludes that, in a 
Rawlsian society, fetal-homicide laws necessarily reflect the “personhood” 
status of fetuses. Section C then analyzes the reasonableness of each 
“presumed original position” in light of Rawls’s writings, and concludes that, 
from a Rawlsian perspective, our current fetal-homicide laws cannot be 
reconciled with abortion rights.148
fetal rights, the judgment fails to rise to the level of “considered,” this Article nonetheless 
plays it safe and presumes, arguendo, that it does.  
148 As a theoretical matter, one could also analyze a judgment’s stability through 
inductive reasoning.  This would entail: (1) devising a reasonable original position; (2) 
deriving its implicated principles of justice; and (3) comparing these principles to society’s 
judgments.  This inductive approach, however, is not practical.  By starting with a devised
original position, the outcome of the entire stability analysis would turn on the subject’s 
arbitrary impression of whether certain personal characteristics were irrelevant.  Such a 
methodology also fails to appreciate that a societal judgment could match principles
implicated at more than one reasonable original position.  Thus, the deductive approach 
followed in this Article is preferable as it starts from a more reliable position (current 
societal judgments) and accounts for the possibility that several reasonable original 
positions could implicate principles matching these judgments.
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A. Deducing Matching Principles of Justice
The first step of the Rawlsian sustainability analysis is to inventory all of the 
principles of justice that could plausibly correspond to the bifurcated fetal-
rights scheme.  The contours of the scheme, which were set forth in Part I, are 
illustrated in Table 1:
Table 1: The Fetal-Rights Scheme
ELEMENT OF SCHEME SOURCE
1.   Fetuses at all stages of gestation are unique 
human beings
Criminal codes
2.   The unlawful killing of fetuses is characterized 
and punished similarly to that of the unlawful 
killing of born humans
Criminal codes
3.   Pregnant women can procure nontherapeutic  
abortions until viability
Roe and progeny
4.   Pregnant women can procure therapeutic 
abortions until birth
Roe and progeny
5.   Women cannot be prosecuted for committing 
acts harmful to fetuses in their wombs 
Criminal codes
A quick review of this scheme suggests that the two most determinative 
factors impacting when a fetus enjoys basic human rights are the “party acting 
on the fetus” and the fetus's “stage of development.”  This Article assumes that 
there are two possible types of parties acting on the fetus: either a “mother” or 
a “third party.”149  It also assumes that rights can be triggered at one of three 
149 “Third parties,” as used below, refers to actors that are neither the fetus’s mother nor 
persons acting at the direction of its mother.  See, e.g., Commonwealth v. Bullock, 913 A.2d 
207, 215 (Pa. 2006) (stating that “the challenged distinction consists of the mother versus 
everyone else”).  
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stages: “all,” “some,” or “none.”  Working under these assumptions, nine 
plausible principles of justice emerge.  These are set forth in Table 2.150
Table 2: Potential Principles of Justice
HUMAN RIGHTS VS. MOTHER
All stages
Some 
stages
No stage
All stages Principle A Principle B Principle C
Some 
stages
Principle D Principle E Principle F
HUMAN 
RIGHTS
VS. 
THIRD 
PARTIES No stage Principle G Principle H Principle I
Principles D, G, and H can be dismissed out of hand.  It is, after all, 
inarguable that fetal rights do not emerge vis-à-vis one’s mother before they do 
against third parties.  This leaves us with the following six potential principles 
to explain the current fetal-rights scheme:
(A) Human rights vest against both their mothers and third parties at all 
stages of gestation.
(B) Human rights vest against third parties at all stages of gestation and 
against their mothers at a particular stage of gestation.
(C) Human rights vest against third parties at all stages of gestation, and 
never against their mothers.
(E) Human rights vest against mothers and third parties at a particular stage 
of gestation.
(F) Human rights vest against third parties at a particular stage of gestation, 
and never against their mothers.
(I) Human rights do not vest against either their mothers or third parties at 
any stage of gestation.
Principle A, which holds that fetuses have human rights against all parties at 
all times, makes a bad match because it conflicts with Elements 3 through 5 of 
the fetal-rights scheme.  This principle most directly contravenes the Supreme 
150 One could debate whether, taking into account the right to abortion, the fetus (1) lacks 
human rights vis-à-vis its mother, or (2) has human rights which are simply outweighed by 
its mother’s right to privacy or liberty.  Human rights are “core” rights (e.g., the right to life) 
which can be overridden only under discrete and well-defined circumstances (e.g., just war 
and certain types of self-defense).  This Article works on the premise that a fetus lacks 
human rights in any relationship in which its right to life can be lawfully overridden for a 
reason falling outside the traditional list of justifications.
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Court’s declaration in Casey151 that a state may not place an undue burden on a 
pregnant woman’s ability to obtain nontherapeutic abortions prior to fetal 
viability.152  The mother's right to abort a pre-viable fetus at her unfettered 
discretion indicates that pre-viable fetuses lack human rights in their
relationships with their mothers.  It seems Principle A could only match the 
fetal-rights scheme if society were to adopt unreasonably expansive theories of 
implicit consent or self-defense.  The idea would be that the pre-viable fetus 
has human rights but implicitly consents to all acts of its mother – including 
her decision to terminate it.  But theories of implied consent are applied under 
narrow and rare circumstances.  And it is simply unreasonable to suggest that 
an American court would impute an implied consent to be killed from the 
silence of a party in a temporary state of physical dependence.153  Similarly, it 
would be improper to expand the doctrine of self-defense in this circumstance.  
The principle of self-defense permits one to use deadly force against another 
person when faced with imminent threat of death or great bodily harm154 –
threats that are by definition absent in the context of non-therapeutic abortions.  
And so it seems clear that Principle A is a poor match for the current bifurcated 
fetal-rights scheme.
Also off the mark are Principles E, F, and I, each of which provides, among 
other things, that pre-viable fetuses lack human rights against third parties.  As 
outlined in Elements 1 and 2, the majority of fetal-homicide laws expressly 
define pre-viable fetuses as human beings (or persons), recognize such fetuses 
as victims separate from their mothers, and similarly characterize and punish 
the unlawful killing of born persons and fetuses.155  Principles E, F, and I could 
only match the scheme if fetal-homicide laws were nothing more than a legal 
fiction enacted for the sole purpose of protecting the mother’s reproductive 
rights.  But as discussed in Part I, fetal-homicide laws draw no exception for 
those instances where the mother (or other family members) are opposed to the 
prosecution of the third-party perpetrator.  Put simply, fetal-homicide laws 
151 505 U.S. 833 (1992).
152 Id. at 877 (“[W]e answer the question . . . whether a law designed to further the 
State’s interest in fetal life which imposes an undue burden on the woman’s decision before 
fetal viability could be constitutional.  The answer is no.” (citation omitted)). 
153 See Collins v. Heaster, 619 S.E.2d 165, 169-70 (W. Va. 2005) (finding no precedent 
to support the appellant’s “expansive view of implied consent,” and observing “[i]t is 
noteworthy that these limited examples of ‘implied’ consent from other jurisdictions involve 
circumstances where immediate action was necessary to avoid serious harm or risk of harm 
[to the consenting party]”); R v. Dudley & Stevens, (1884) 14 Q.B.D. 273, 286-87 (rejecting 
the theory that a cabin boy killed on the high seas would have hypothetically agreed that the 
defendants’ lives were more important than his, and would have been willing to die so that 
the defendants could carry on as breadwinners for their families).
154 See, e.g., MODEL PENAL CODE § 3.04(2)(b) (1962).
155 See supra notes 23 & 25 (listing state fetal-homicide laws).
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seek, at least in part, to protect and vindicate the rights of fetuses against third 
parties.
The two closest matches – Principles B and C – each recognize that fetuses 
have human rights against third parties, and that pre-viable fetuses have no 
rights against their mothers.  So it is clear, no matter which principle governs, 
that we are working within a human-rights dichotomy.156  But the two 
principles split on the murkier issue of whether the dichotomy extends to 
viable fetuses: Principle B holds that fetuses have rights against third parties at 
all stages and none against their mothers at certain stages of gestation (i.e., pre-
viability); Principle C holds that fetuses at all stages have rights against third 
parties and none vis-à-vis their mothers.  At quick glance, neither theory 
appears to be a particularly good match: Principle B because it fails to account 
for the maternal safe harbor in fetal-homicide laws (Element 5); and Principle 
C because the Constitution does not guarantee a mother’s right to 
nontherapeutic, post-viability abortions (the corollary to Element 3).
The apparent flaw in Principle B becomes more pronounced under scrutiny.  
The maternal safe harbor provisions (which are included in all fetal-homicide 
laws) are expansive.  They bar prosecutions of mothers, not only for fetal 
deaths resulting from constitutionally-protected activity, but also for those 
deaths caused by unprotected acts (such as late-term, nontherapeutic abortions 
or the use of illicit drugs).157  Moreover, safe harbor provisions generally apply 
to acts committed by the mother at any point during her pregnancy.  Because 
the law generally exempts a mother from all criminal liability for causing the 
death of her late-term fetus, it seems unreasonable to conclude that fetal rights 
ever exist vis-à-vis their mother.  Thus, Principle B, which holds that rights of 
fetuses vest at a particular stage of gestation, does not sufficiently match the 
fetal-rights scheme.
On the contrary, our initial concerns with Principle C actually diminish upon 
closer examination.  Societal prohibitions on nontherapeutic, post-viability 
abortions do not necessarily indicate that viable fetuses have human rights 
relative to their mothers.  Rather, the ban is more likely grounded in society’s 
generalized discomfort with a procedure widely perceived to be unnecessary.  
First, society finds late-term abortions unattractive in large part because viable 
fetuses tend to resemble newborn babies in both a physical and behavioral 
sense.158  Second, late-term abortions are only banned, despite their perceived 
156 In both scenarios, the fetus, during at least some stages of its gestation, faces the 
dichotomy of having rights against third parties and no rights against its mother.  
157 See Commonwealth v. Bullock, 913 A.2d 207, 216 (Pa. 2006) (holding that the 
legislature had a rational basis for exempting mothers from criminal prosecutions under 
such circumstances).
158 See Partial-Birth Abortion Ban Act of 2003, Pub. L. No. 108-105, 117 Stat. 1201, 
1206 (codified as amended at 18 U.S.C. § 1531) (stating Congress’s conclusion that “[t]he 
gruesome and inhumane nature of the partial-birth abortion procedure and its disturbing 
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unattractiveness, when they are unnecessary.  Regarding a non-therapeutic 
abortion, the thinking is that the mother has already had several months to 
evaluate the implications of her pregnancy and deliberate on the issue of 
abortion.159  Necessity, however, reemerges when the pregnancy appears to 
threaten the mother’s physical or emotional well-being.160  Because the 
maintenance of one's emotional health does not, in our legal tradition, override 
another person's basic human rights, it seems that the current prohibitions on 
elective, late-term abortions are grounded in society’s general distaste for a 
seemingly unnecessary procedure rather than the proposition that a fetus 
possesses human rights vis-à-vis its mother.161  It thus seems clear that the 
principle underlying the current fetal-rights scheme is as follows:  Fetuses at 
all stages of gestation possess human rights against third parties and lack 
human rights against their mothers.162  The following Sections analyze this 
matching principle.
similarity to the killing of a newborn infant promotes a complete disregard for infant human 
life that can only be countered by a prohibition of the procedure”).
159 See, e.g., Greg M. Shaw, The Polls – Trends: Abortion, 67 PUB. OPINION Q. 407, 413 
(2003) (observing that there is far stronger support for abortions for women whose life or 
health are threatened by the pregnancy than for those who are motivated by fetal defects, 
financial hardship, or no desire for children); Public Agenda, Abortion: Overview,
http://www.publicagenda.org/issues/overview.cfm?issue_type=abortion (last visited Oct. 9, 
2007) (stating that “two-thirds of Americans say abortion should be legal during the first 
trimester, but . . . drops to 8 percent in the third trimester”).
160 See Public Agenda, supra note 159 (explaining that more than three-quarters of 
Americans believe that abortions should be legal when the health of the mother is at risk).
161 But society’s belief that a certain act is unnecessary and a blight (or even that “fetal 
life” has protectable interests) does not necessarily establish that human rights are at stake.  
For example, our laws have long prohibited acts of cruelty to many types of animal life.  See 
generally David Favre & Vivien Tsang, The Development of Anti-Cruelty Laws During the 
1800’s, 1993 DETROIT C.L. REV. 1 (tracing the origins of anti-cruelty law in the United 
States from a pure property protection – e.g., prohibition on the stealing of horses – to the 
ensuing development of anti-cruelty law).  Rawls commented:
Certainly it is wrong to be cruel to animals and the destruction of a whole species can 
be a great evil.  The capacity for feelings of pleasure and pain and for the forms of life 
of which animals are capable clearly imposes duties of compassion and humanity in 
their case.  I shall not attempt to explain these considered beliefs.  They are outside the 
scope of the theory of justice, and it does not seem possible to extend the contract 
doctrine so as to include them in a natural way.
RAWLS, THEORY OF JUSTICE, supra note 84, at 448.
162 It is important to see that the choice between Principles B and C has little effect on 
the analysis in subsequent Sections.  The difference between the two merely relates to how 
far the dichotomy extends.  Under Principle C, we see a rights-dichotomy for all fetuses, but 
with Principle B it is confined to only pre-viable fetuses.  Rawlsians, I argue, should reject 
both principles for the reasons set forth in Part III.C. 
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B. Obviating Public Reason
The general Rawlsian sustainability test, set forth in Part II, provides that a 
societal judgment is stable if it matches either (1) a principle inherent in a 
political conception or (2) a principle that could emerge through the process of 
public reasoning.  Rawls was clear that, at the original position, agents can 
select from a menu of potential political conceptions of justice.  If, 
theoretically, the agents choose a classical utilitarian or a classical natural-
rights conception, it seems that both stability prongs are potentially relevant: 
the principle could be inherent in the chosen political conception or through 
the process of public reason.  This renders the sustainability analysis extremely 
spongy in that the second prong, public reason, creates a myriad of policy 
possibilities, leaving us with virtually no opportunity to evaluate the stability 
of a particular issue.  Fortunately, Rawls did not think that agents at the 
original position would adopt a utilitarian or classical natural-rights conception
of justice.  He instead believed that the agents would inevitably choose his own 
ideal of “justice as fairness.”163  Rawls’s presumption, it turns out, has a 
significant impact on our analysis.
Fixing the political conception at justice as fairness simplifies our 
sustainability analysis of the bifurcated fetal-rights scheme.  When agents 
settle on justice as fairness, the two components of the sustainability test can, 
for issues which touch on status or fundamental rights, be truncated into one.  
Under such circumstances, the sole issue becomes whether the judgment’s 
matching principle is inherent to the political conception (which is, of course, 
presumed to be justice as fairness).  If not, the societal judgment is unstable.
The justification for dropping the public reason component is 
straightforward enough: justice as fairness seeks to ensure equality and 
consistency on issues affecting status or personhood issues.164  Rawls 
suggested that the alternative process of public reason is unsuited to determine 
issues such as “those deriving from differences in status, class position, or 
occupation, or from differences in ethnicity, gender, or race.”165  He went on to 
state that “the idea of the person, when specified into a conception of the 
163 See RAWLS, RESTATEMENT, supra note 14, at 61 (“The hope is that [justice as 
fairness] with its account of primary goods can win the support of an overlapping 
consensus.”).
164 This is supported by the fact that Rawls “distinguishes human rights from the liberal 
democratic rights required by political liberalism.”  Samuel Freeman, Introduction to THE 
CAMBRIDGE COMPANION TO RAWLS, supra note 92, at 47.  “To deny people the right to vote 
or freedom of artistic expression seriously infringes liberal justice, but it is not as egregious 
as denying them the right to life, torturing or enslaving them, or persecuting them for their 
religion.”  Id.  In such cases, people are “not seen as independent agents with a good that is 
worthy of respect or consideration.” Id. (citing JOHN RAWLS, THE LAW OF PEOPLES 68 
(1999)).
165 RAWLS, Public Reason Revisited, supra note 11, at 612.
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person, belongs to a political conception.”166  These types of questions should 
not be left to the unpredictability of public reason, but should instead be 
discerned by reference to the principles dictated by the conception of justice 
chosen at the original position.167  “For what reasons,” Rawls rhetorically 
asked, “can both satisfy the criterion of reciprocity and justify denying to some 
persons religious liberty, holding others as slaves, imposing a property 
qualification on the right to vote, or denying the right of suffrage to 
women?”168
Our designated matching principle, as set forth in Section A, indicates that 
fetuses have been granted protections approximating human rights versus third 
parties.169  Rawls’s writings suggest that, when working within the justice as 
fairness conception, principles granting human rights cannot be the product of 
public reason but must instead be given by the conception.  Or, in other words, 
the principle must actually be agreed upon by agents at Rawls's original 
position.  Moving forward, our sustainability analysis therefore turns on 
whether the matching principle could be chosen at an original position that is 
reasonable in a Rawlsian sense.
C. Identifying Presumed Original Positions
Because the matching principle intimates that fetuses possess some human 
rights, and because we are operating under Rawls’s presumption that agents 
166 RAWLS, RESTATEMENT, supra note 14, at 19.
167 See RAWLS, Public Reason Revisited, supra note 11, at 612.  Professor Frank 
Michelman’s work on the value of context is also instructive here.  See Frank I. Michelman, 
Rawls on Constitutionalism and Constitutional Law, in THE CAMBRIDGE COMPANION TO 
RAWLS, supra note 92, at 394.  He argues that the necessity of public reason lies in the 
distinction between inalienable rights and “situation-specific” rights.  The latter type of 
rights need a “relatively fine adjustment of the reciprocal extents of the liberties in the 
scheme of basic liberties that is likely to call for more contextual knowledge and finer-
grained, more contestable social-causal calculation than Rawls . . . believes constitutional 
lawmaking can effectively and legitimately bear.”  Id. at 418.  Michelman argues that public 
reason, due to its superior elasticity, is well-equipped to define situation-specific rights.  See 
id. (discussing how questions of basic liberties can be “too complexly situation-specific to 
be aptly resolvable at the level of constitutional law”).
168 RAWLS, Public Reason Revisited, supra note 11, at 579.  For example, Rawls explains 
that the prohibition on slavery is not left to public reason, but rather it is dictated by our 
conception of justice: “Since the rejection of slavery is a clear case of securing the 
constitutional essential of the equal basic liberties, surely Lincoln’s view was 
reasonable . . . while Douglas’s was not.  Therefore, Lincoln’s view is supported by any 
reasonable comprehensive doctrine.”  Id. at 610.
169 Rawls stated that if, for some reason justice as fairness is not selected, abortion rights 
could be left to public reason.  Rawls, Public Reason, supra note 89, at 243 n.32.  Because 
this Article fixes the political conception at justice as fairness, principles relevant to the 
abortion issue, which involves fundamental status issues, are not left to public reason but are 
rather given by the conception itself.  
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will settle on justice as fairness as the operative political conception, we can 
ignore the process of public reason. Instead, we need only analyze whether the 
matching principle could be chosen at a “reasonable” original position.  A 
reasonable original position, as discussed in Part II, is one where representative 
agents operate behind a veil of ignorance which conceals personal 
characteristics and beliefs.170  The two critical components of any original 
position are: (1) the scope of the parties’ representation, and (2) the 
information set behind the veil.  The scope of agency is particularly relevant to 
the question, set forth in the Introduction, whether fetal-homicide laws reflect 
societal notions of fetal “personhood.”  For if fetuses are represented by agents 
at the original position, they are deemed to be “persons” in a Rawlsian 
sense.171  The following paragraphs seek to discern the components of all
original positions that would yield the matching principle developed in the 
previous Section (i.e., that fetuses at all stages of gestation have human rights 
against third parties but no human rights against their mothers).
1. The Identification Process
Before we begin, the process of identifying plausible original positions 
warrants some discussion.  Some principles of justice, so long as it is known 
that they were chosen at an original position rather than through the process of 
public reason, reveal dispositive information about their implicating original 
position.  This can be illustrated by a few hypothetical scenarios.  Take, for 
example, the principle that society should reasonably accommodate disabled 
persons.  If information about who would be disabled were not placed behind 
the veil, the parties (a majority of whom would need no such accommodations) 
would likely reject an accommodation principle.  From the perspective of one 
from the majority, the marginal costs incurred by such protections would 
surely exceed their marginal benefits.  But notice how a starkly different result 
arises once information about who will be disabled is concealed from the 
parties.  Because each party would be uncertain of their status, and thus fearful 
of being in the disabled minority, a Rawlsian would argue that the parties 
would agree on the principle of accommodation.172  This example shows that at 
170 See RAWLS, THEORY OF JUSTICE, supra note 84, at 11-12.
171 As Rawls explained:
Moral persons are distinguished by two features: first they are capable of having . . . a 
conception of their good (as expressed by a rational plan of life); and second they are 
capable of having (and are assumed to acquire) a sense of justice . . . . Thus equal 
justice is owed to those who have the capacity to take part in and to act in accordance 
with the public understanding of the initial situation.
See id. at 442 
172 See id. at 11-12, 144 (explaining how risk and uncertainty will cause agents at the 
original position “to weigh[] more heavily the advantages of those whose situation is less 
fortunate”).
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least some principles provide good information about the content of the veil of 
ignorance at their implicating original position.
A principle can also provide dispositive information about whom the agents 
represent at the original position.  Consider the principle that one should not 
arbitrarily harm certain animal species.173  Despite the fact that the protected 
species benefit from this principle, we know that their interests are not 
represented at the original position because the protections are weak and the 
standards of liability are riddled with safe harbor provisions.174  When the 
scope of agency is confined to humans, there is no incentive for the parties to 
similarly protect non-humans and humans, and so the agents would not readily 
endorse a principle subjecting humans to overwhelming damages for harming
non-humans.  If, on the other hand, the protected species were represented at 
the original position, we could expect their protections to be comparable to 
those for humans.  This demonstrates that one can, under certain 
circumstances, deduce from a particular principle essential information about 
the agents’ scope of representation at the implicating original position.
2. Limits to the Identification Process
There are, however, two primary limits to identifying components of the 
original position from a given principle of justice.  First, a principle may 
provide no insight regarding a given component of the original position if that 
component has no dispositive effect on the agents’ consideration of that 
principle.  Second, a principle may not provide good information about its 
components because its application is confined to the public domain.
a. Principles Reveal Only Necessary Components
A principle of justice selected at a given original position will only provide 
information about those components that have a dispositive effect on the 
agents’ consideration of that principle.  Take, for example, the principle that 
the death penalty is a just form of punishment.  If agents at the original 
position knew they would lack a strong propensity for violence, they would 
plausibly support the notion of capital punishment on the ground that the 
sanction would not harm them and the threat of execution might deter 
dangerous citizens from committing murder.  A similar result is reached, 
however, if information regarding the agents’ propensity for violence is 
concealed behind the veil of ignorance.  At this original position, agents might 
173 See, e.g., 1 BRIAN BARRY, A TREATISE ON SOCIAL JUSTICE: THEORIES OF JUSTICE 207 
(1989) (“[S]ympathy for animals varies a great deal from one time and place to another and 
is at best concentrated mainly on pets and petlike animals rather than on those defined as 
food, game, or pests.”).
174 Compare 16 U.S.C. §§ 1538(a)(2)(B), 1540(b)(1) (2000) (stating that people who 
“damage or destroy” endangered species face maximum punishments of a fifty thousand 
dollar fine or up to one year in jail or both), with 18 U.S.C. § 1111(b) (2000) (describing the 
punishments for murder as either a term of years, life imprisonment, or death).
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still support capital punishment because, even if the agents ultimately 
possessed a propensity for violence, the death penalty’s potential deterrent 
effect might keep the agents safe from other murderers and might discourage 
the agents from acting on their own dangerous impulses.  In this scenario, 
where the variable component might have no dispositive effect on the 
consideration of a given principle, the existence of that principle provides no 
definitive information about the components at the implicating original 
position.175  Thus, this deductive process only reveals those components of the 
original position that have a dispositive impact on the selection of the matching 
principle of justice.
b. Principles Govern Only Matters in the Public Domain
There is a second potential limitation on the process of identifying original 
positions from principles of justice.  Importantly, principles only regulate the 
“public domain.”  One must therefore allow for the possibility that a given 
principle of justice is not the result of rational selection by agents under certain 
conditions at the original position, but rather the remaining portion of a 
broader principle that has been truncated by the public domain limitation.  For 
example, a principle that children have no right to a healthy diet is not so much 
a result of the particular components at the original position.  Instead, it reflects 
the inherent structure of Rawls’s model, by which the application of principles 
are limited to the public domain.
For the purposes of this Article, however, there is no need for concern since 
the matching principle concerns matters wholly within Rawls’s public domain.  
Rawls was explicit that the public domain extends to the household when it 
serves as a place for institutionalized abuse or forms unjust desires in its 
members.176  The matching principle, as outlined in Part III.A, parses fetal 
rights in relation to (1) its mother and (2) third parties.  The second component, 
which concerns third parties, is of course unaffected by the public domain 
limitation.  Relying exclusively on this component, this Article concludes 
175 One reaches a similarly inconclusive result by analyzing the principle that humans 
enjoy the right to die.  If information were not available at the original position about which 
agents would become terminally ill and incapacitated, agents would likely recognize a right 
to die because they would not take the risk of being terminally ill without such a right.  But 
even if agents had perfect information at the original position, and knew they would never 
become terminally ill, risk-averse agents could still plausibly support a right to die on the 
ground that it provides a benefit (e.g., lowers society’s health-care costs) and imposes no 
risk of harm to others.  One need not agree with these actual conclusions to appreciate the 
point that many principles do not necessarily indicate the components of their implicating
original positions.
176 See RAWLS, Public Reason Revisited, supra note 11, at 598 (stating that “the 
principles of justice impose constraints on the family on behalf of children who as society’s 
future citizens have basic rights as such,” and arguing that children who witness injustices 
within the family face difficulty in “acquir[ing] the political virtues required of future 
citizens in a viable democratic society”).
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(infra in Section C) that fetuses are persons represented by agents at the 
original position.  And because Rawls is clear that the public domain extends 
to protect persons from their families, there is no external limitation preventing 
agents from selecting principles protecting the core rights of fetal persons 
against familial intrusion.  So we see that both the first and second components
of the principle constitute a reflection of the agent’s rational selection process 
rather than a byproduct of an external limitation regarding the reach of 
principles.  Accordingly, the public domain limitation does not inhibit the 
identification of plausible original positions from the matching principle.
3. Applying the Process
After setting forth the identification process and its limitations, we are now 
ready to analyze the matching principle for information about its implicating 
original position.  Remember that the matching principle, distilled in Section
A, holds that fetuses at all stages of gestation have human rights against third 
parties but no human rights against their mothers.  The Table below illustrates 
this principle.
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Table 3: The Matching Principle
Our objective is to now decipher whether this principle is inherent in a 
conception of justice that could be selected at a reasonable original position.  
We begin by trying to deduce the implicating original position’s “scope of 
agency,” and then turn to evaluate the “content behind its veil.”
a. Scope of Agency
Upon closer examination, the matching principle provides dispositive 
information about which parties are represented at the implicating original 
HUMAN RIGHTS VESTING
vs. Mother vs. Third Party
First 
Month
No human
rights
Human rights
Second 
Month
No human
rights
Human rights
Third 
Month
No human
rights
Human rights
Fourth 
Month
No human
rights
Human rights
Fifth 
Month
No human
rights
Human rights
Sixth 
Month
No human
rights
Human rights
Seventh 
Month
No human
rights
Human rights
Eighth 
Month
No human
rights
Human rights
STAGE OF 
GESTATION
Ninth 
Month
No human
rights
Human rights
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position.  The principle, as can be seen in Table 3, grants at least some fetuses 
full human rights.  This principle could certainly be chosen at an original 
position where agents represented both fetuses and born humans.  With this 
scope of agency, the primary benefits of granting human rights to fetuses, from 
the agents’ perspective, would be threefold: (1) the fetus’s gain from the 
protection of bodily integrity and potential moral agency; (2) the parental gain 
from increased protection of reproductive rights; and (3) the societal gain from 
decreased general violence.  The expected cost of extending human rights to 
fetuses against third parties would be simply that a person might be classified 
and punished, rightly or wrongly, as a murderer for committing a crime against 
a pregnant woman that causes a miscarriage.  Here, the benefits of granting 
fetuses human rights would quite clearly outweigh its costs, and the agents 
would in turn opt to extend human rights to fetuses.
But fetal representation is not merely a sufficient condition for the selection 
of the matching principle – it is also a necessary condition.  If the agents only 
represented born human beings, and did not represent the interests of fetuses, it 
seems doubtful that fetuses would be granted human rights against third 
parties.  This is because the benefit of such a grant would have, from the 
agents’ perspective, dramatically shifted.  Gone is the sense that the destruction 
of “one’s bodily integrity and potential for moral agency” lies in the balance.  
The primary benefit for these agents is simply the parent’s increased protection 
of reproductive rights, and society’s interest in deterring general violence.  It is 
highly unlikely that these potential benefits would outweigh the potential costs 
that one might be classified and punished as a murderer for committing a crime 
against a pregnant woman that causes a miscarriage.177  In other words, it 
seems doubtful that such agents would treat the killing of a fetus as a 
“murder,” a term which has, after all, been reserved in our legal tradition for 
the most severe and heinous acts against society.  This is not to say that such 
agents would have no interest in protecting fetal life or the mother’s right to a 
violence-free pregnancy.  But it is to say that agents would turn to less extreme 
sanctions.178  
It being established that fetuses are represented at the original position, we 
need to briefly consider when this representation begins.  The matching 
principle does not distinguish between fetuses based on their stage of 
177 The fetus’s rights vest against third-parties even if the mother is, for whatever reason, 
opposed to having the third party charged with murder.  See discussion supra Part I.A.  In 
such a case, the principle that the fetus has personhood rights against third parties will, at 
least in theory, not benefit all future mothers.
178 For example, agents might agree to prohibit “feticide,” which has historically focused 
on protecting the parent’s interest in the fetus, and, as such, carried a lighter social stigma 
and penal sanction than murder.  The agents could alternatively define fetuses as 
“nonpersons” and classify acts causing their death as a crime more akin to trespass to 
chattel.  Lastly, they might treat “pregnancy” as an aggravating factor in any underlying 
crime against a woman.  
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development.  For instance, a one-month-old fetus and a nine-month-old fetus 
each have human rights against third parties and no rights against their 
mothers.  Put another way, a fetus enjoys relatively no comparative advantage 
based on its advanced stage of development.  As such, we can definitively 
conclude that the matching principle would only be implicated at an original 
position where agents represented fetuses at all stages of gestation.
This analysis of agency representation provides us with an answer to the 
first question set forth in the Introduction: whether the current scheme of fetal-
homicide laws indicates a societal recognition of fetal “personhood.”  Because 
such laws could only be chosen in accord with a Rawlsian original position if 
fetuses were duly represented by agents, Rawlsians who support these laws 
must, at least implicitly, recognize that fetuses are persons.
b. Content of Veil
The matching principle, in addition to suggesting the scope of agency, 
speaks volumes about the information necessarily withheld from agents and 
placed behind the veil of ignorance.  As shown by Table 3, the matching 
principle holds that a fetus’s human rights vest against third parties but not 
against mothers.  Upon accounting for the fact that the agents represent both 
born persons and fetuses, it seems obvious that this matching principle could 
be chosen if the agents had reliable information regarding their mother’s 
likelihood to harm her fetus.179  By making such information available at the 
original position, the expected benefits of the matching principle would, for a 
substantial majority of agents, outweigh its expected costs.  The expected 
benefits are significant, coming in the form of broad reproductive freedoms.  
As recognized by the Supreme Court in Roe:
Maternity, or additional offspring, may force upon the woman a 
distressful life and future.  Psychological harm may be imminent.  Mental 
and physical health may be taxed by child care.  There is also the distress, 
for all concerned, associated with the unwanted child, and there is the 
problem of bringing a child into a family already unable, psychologically 
and otherwise, to care for it.  In other cases, as in this one, the additional 
difficulties and continuing stigma of unwed motherhood may be 
involved.180
Conversely, the expected costs are, for the clear majority of agents, zero.  
After all, once armed with good information about their mothers, most agents 
179 This information would include the mother’s willingness to procure an abortion or 
ingest substances harmful to her fetus during pregnancy.
180 Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 153 (1973).  But see ANITA L. ALLEN, UNEASY ACCESS:
PRIVACY FOR WOMEN IN A FREE SOCIETY 56 (1988) (“The women’s movement, education, 
access to affordable birth control, liberalized divorce laws, and the larger role for women in 
politics, government, and the economy have expanded women’s opinions and contributed to 
the erosion of oppressively nonegalitarian styles of home life.”).
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would realize no risk in subordinating fetal rights to maternal rights.  
Accordingly, the matching principle could clearly be selected at an original 
position where agents possessed information about their mothers’ likelihood to 
cause them harm.
The availability of information about one’s mother is not only sufficient, but 
it is indeed necessary, for the matching principle to be selected.  For, without 
such information, all the agents, who represent both born persons and fetuses, 
would perceive the subordination of fetal rights to maternal liberty as highly 
threatening.  Abortion rights, from the agents’ view, present the possibility of 
arbitrary termination of biological identity and capacity to pursue moral 
agency.181  The benefit of the principle is that agents will have the autonomy to 
terminate any unwanted pregnancy.  From the agents’ perspective, this is an 
easy decision: The matching principle’s expected benefits, while crucial to 
ensuring fuller autonomy over their individual lives once born, do not justify 
the substantial risk of not making it to a live birth.182  Accordingly, it seems 
clear that the agents’ consideration of the matching principle, which wholly 
subordinates the fetuses’ lives to the liberty of their mothers, turns directly on 
whether the agents possessed good, reliable information whether they would be 
injured by their mothers during their fetal development.  It can therefore be 
deduced that information about one’s mother is not concealed behind the veil 
of ignorance at the presumed original position.
So if society adopts Rawls’s justice as fairness as its political conception, 
the matching principle could only be chosen at an original position where (1) 
agents represent the interests of born humans and fetuses of all stages of 
181 And while Rawls was clear that agents behind the veil do not know their actual 
chances of being situated in a socially inferior position, it is worth noting that the odds that 
an agent would incur such losses are not negligible as roughly twenty percent of fetuses in 
the United States are aborted.  See Lawrence B. Finer & Stanley K. Henshaw, Abortion 
Incidence and Services in the United States in 2000, 35 PERSP. ON SEXUAL & REPROD.
HEALTH 6, 9 (2003), available at http://www.guttmacher.org/pubs/psrh/full/3500603.pdf.
182 The right to abortion is deemed to be fundamental by many in our society.  Yet there 
is a wide consensus that this right is not more fundamental than the right to life.  No matter 
how physically and psychologically damaging it might be to carry an unwanted fetus to full 
term, even the most strident of pro-choice advocates would acknowledge that the mother is 
better off than if her life were taken.  The point is simply to say that the right to life (once 
you’ve decided an entity is entitled to it) is more fundamental than the right to abortion.  
This point is further supported by Rawls’s model of justice, in which basic liberties “have a 
central range of application,” yet “can be limited and adjusted [when] they clash with other 
basic liberties.”  JOHN RAWLS, Reply to Alexander and Musgrave, in JOHN RAWLS:
COLLECTED PAPERS, supra note 11, at 232, 239.  The right to life, which is regularly 
perceived to be the most fundamental of all rights, can only be overridden in our legal 
tradition in discrete and well-defined circumstances such as self-defense.  And so it seems 
unlikely that agents without information about their mothers would ever agree on a principle 
that allowed for abortions that could not be justified by the self-defense doctrine (e.g., 
nontherapeutic abortions).
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gestation and (2) the veil of ignorance does not conceal information regarding 
whether agents will be harmed by their mothers.  The next Section analyzes the 
reasonability of this presumed original position and thus offers us information 
on the political sustainability of the bifurcated fetal-rights scheme.
D. Reasonableness of the Presumed Original Position
To evaluate the lasting stability of the bifurcated fetal-rights judgment from 
a Rawlsian perspective, one must examine whether that judgment matches a 
principle of justice that could be chosen at an original position that Rawls 
would have deemed “reasonable.”  At this point we have reconstructed the only
plausible original position where agents could choose a principle of justice 
matching the fetal-rights scheme.  This “presumed” original position, as shown 
in Section B, extends representation to fetuses at all stages of gestation and 
provides agents with information about whether the agents will be harmed by 
their mothers.  The following paragraphs consider the reasonableness of this 
presumed original position.
1. Reasonableness of Expanding Scope of Agency to Fetuses
Agents at the presumed original position represent fetuses at all stages of 
gestation.  An original position, as explained in Part II, is reasonable when, 
among other things, agents extend their representation to all “those who could 
take part in the initial agreement, were it not for fortuitous circumstances.”183
The following paragraphs evaluate the fortuity of fetal gestation, placing 
particular emphasis on Rawls’s discussions of “temporary incompetence” and 
“generation.”
a. Fortuitousness of Temporary Incompetence
Temporary incompetence is regarded as a fortuitous condition in a Rawlsian 
society.  Individuals are entitled to equality, wrote Rawls, if they possess the 
“capacity to acquire” a sense of justice and a judgment of personal good as 
expressed by a rational life plan.184  This view constitutes a break from the 
traditional rights theorists, such as Locke, Rousseau, and Kant, who believed 
actual competence was a necessary condition of full human liberty.185  Rawls 
183 RAWLS, THEORY OF JUSTICE, supra note 84, at 446 (emphasis added); see 1 BARRY,
supra note 173, at 210 (explaining “fortuitous” to mean “everything about people that 
should not play any role in determining the way in which they should be treated”).
184 See RAWLS, THEORY OF JUSTICE, supra note 84, at 442 (“Moral persons are 
distinguished by two features: first they are capable of having . . . a conception of their good 
(as expressed by a rational plan of life); and second they are capable of having (and are 
assumed to acquire) a sense of justice . . . .”).
185 See Katherine Hunt Federle, Children, Curfews, and the Constitution, 73 WASH. U. 
L.Q. 1315, 1320-21 (1995) (arguing that Rawls expanded the theories set forth by the 
traditional rights theorists, who believed that children were not entitled to “the full panoply 
of rights accorded to adults because of their incapacity to obligate others”).
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explained that “[i]t is sometimes thought that basic rights and liberties should 
vary with capacity, but justice as fairness denies this: provided the minimum 
for moral personality is satisfied, a person is owed all the guarantees of 
justice.”186  Rawls continued that “[a] being that has this capacity, whether or 
not it is yet developed, is to receive the full protection of the principles of 
justice.”187  Children and disabled persons are cited as examples.188  Agents at 
the original position will tend to protect those with undeveloped powers,189 and 
this is to be accomplished by empowering members of society to act on their 
behalf in a manner most likely to secure their future conception of good.190  
When society has little or no knowledge about the particular interests of a 
person with temporary incompetence, it presumes that the person has the 
interests of a rational person.191  Notably, Rawls was careful to distinguish 
between temporary and permanent incompetence,192 and wrote that “those 
more or less permanently deprived of moral personality may present a 
difficulty.”193  With regard to nonhuman animals, for instance, Rawls observed 
186 RAWLS, THEORY OF JUSTICE, supra note 84, at 443.
187 Id. at 445-46.  Rawls explained, “[s]ince infants and children are thought to have 
basic rights (normally exercised on their behalf by parents and guardians), this interpretation 
of the requisite conditions seems necessary to match our considered judgments.”  Id. at 446.
188 Id. at 218-19.
189 See 1 BARRY, supra note 173, at 163 (“To say that this killing or taking is rendered 
just by the inability of the victims to organize an effective resistance would surely be a 
hollow mockery of the idea of justice – adding insult to injury.  Justice is normally thought 
of not as ceasing to be relevant in conditions of extreme inequality in power but, rather, as 
being especially relevant to such conditions.”).
190 See RAWLS, THEORY OF JUSTICE, supra note 84, at 219 (“Others are authorized and 
sometimes required to act on our behalf and to do what we would do for ourselves if we 
were rational, this authorization coming into effect only when we cannot look after our own 
good.”).  Rawls treated children as moral primitives who must be protected from “the 
weakness and infirmities of their reason and will in society.”  Id.
191 See id. (“As we know less and less about a person, we act for him as we would act for 
ourselves from the standpoint of the original position . . . .”).
192 Rawls’s distinction likely stems from the inevitability of temporary incompetence.  
As Eva Feder Kittay has put it:
[T]here are identifiable states of our life history in which dependency is unavoidable, 
either for survival or for flourishing.  The immaturity of infancy and early childhood, 
illness and disability that renders one nonfunctional even in the most accommodating 
surroundings, and the fragility of advanced old age, each serve as examples of such 
inescapable dependency. . . . These are unassailable facts about human existence.  
While conditioned in fundamentally significant ways by cultural considerations, 
dependency for humans is as unavoidable as birth and death are for all living 
organisms.
EVA FEDER KITTAY, LOVE’S LABOR: ESSAYS ON WOMEN, EQUALITY, AND DEPENDENCY 29 
(1999).
193 RAWLS, THEORY OF JUSTICE, supra note 84, at 446.
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that “it does seem that we are not required to give strict justice anyway to 
creatures lacking this capacity.”194  
Status as a human fetus can easily be framed as one more form of temporary 
incompetence.  The fetus, after all, has unique DNA, its program of biological 
and cognitive development is ongoing, and, if unobstructed, this program will 
naturally and likely result in its birth.195  Such temporariness of human 
incompetence is significantly analogous to that of the child, and easily 
distinguishable from the permanent human incompetence of gametes, animals, 
and plants.
b. Fortuitousness of Generation
Rawls’s ideas on “generations” are also relevant to the reasonableness of the 
presumed original position.  The Rawlsian model requires the maintenance of 
“justice between persons at different moments of time.”196  This manifests as 
an affirmative duty to future generations, and thereby obligates agents “to be 
impartial, even between persons who are not contemporaries but who belong to 
many generations.”197  Considering the lives of future citizens, writes Rawls, 
assures “[a]n ideally democratic decision” that is “fairly adjusted to the claims 
of each generation.”198  Rawls’s view that later generations are “virtually” 
194 Id. at 448.  Rawls’s distinction between temporary and permanent incompetence 
should preempt any argument that status as a nonhuman animal species, or, for that matter, 
one’s status as an unfertilized human egg, is a fortuitous condition.
195 See George, supra note 8, at 2493 (“The significance of genetic completeness . . . is 
that no outside genetic material is required to enable the zygote to mature into an embryo, 
the embryo into a fetus, the fetus into an infant, the infant into a child, the child into an 
adolescent, the adolescent into an adult.”).  
196 RAWLS, THEORY OF JUSTICE, supra note 84, at 258 (clarifying that “[t]he present 
generation cannot do as it pleases but is bound by the principles that would be chosen in the 
original position to define justice between persons at different moments of time”).  “Each 
generation must not only preserve the gains of culture and civilization, and maintain intact 
those just institutions that have been established, but it must also put aside in each period of 
time a suitable amount of real capital accumulation.”  Id. at 252.
197 Id. at 514.  Rawls concluded A Theory of Justice as follows:
Thus to see our place in society from the perspective of this position is to see it sub 
specie aeternitatis: it is to regard the human situation not only from all social but also 
from all temporal points of view.  The perspective of eternity is not a perspective from 
a certain place beyond the world, nor the point of view of a transcendent being; rather 
it is a certain form of thought and feeling that rational persons can adopt within the 
world.  And having done so, they can, whatever their generation, bring together into 
one scheme all individual perspectives and arrive together at regulative principles that 
can be affirmed by everyone as he lives by them, each from his own standpoint.  Purity 
of heart, if one could attain it, would be to see clearly and to act with grace and self-
command from this point of view.
Id.
198 Id. at 256 (explaining that future “generations are virtually represented in the original 
position”).  
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represented at the original position has significant implications for our 
sustainability analysis.  It means agents are forced to consider the interests of 
the next generation, which, of course, includes those born, those conceived but 
not yet born, and those not yet conceived.  
Taking into account Rawls’s writings on temporary incompetence and 
generations, it seems that one's stage of fetal gestation can be viewed as a mere 
fortuitous circumstance.  Accordingly, extending the scope of agency to 
include fetuses does not render an original position unreasonable in a Rawlsian 
sense.  
2. Reasonableness of Providing Information About Agents’ Mothers
Agents at the presumed original position necessarily possess good 
information about whether their mothers are likely to injure or terminate their 
fetuses.  An original position is only reasonable, according to Rawls, if agents 
are unaware of their morally irrelevant traits.199  
Rawls made it abundantly clear that  information about the family is morally 
irrelevant,200 arguing that one’s placement in a particular family constitutes a 
“natural lottery”201 resulting in arbitrary distinctions in “class position,” “social 
status,” and “fortune in the distribution of natural assets and abilities.”202  He 
also wrote that “the family may be a barrier to equal chances between 
individuals,”203 individual families perpetuate “arbitrary” effects,204 and “the 
principle of fair opportunity can be only imperfectly carried out, at least as 
long as some form of the family exists.”205
So it is apparent that agents should not have access to information about the 
families that individuals are born into.  But should this prohibition be extended 
199 See id. at 11; see also RAWLS, Powers of Citizens, supra note 101, at 79  (“Features 
relating to social position, native endowment, and historical accident, as well as to the 
content of persons’ determinate conceptions of the good, are irrelevant, politically speaking, 
and hence placed behind the veil of ignorance.”).
200 See RAWLS, THEORY OF JUSTICE, supra note 84, at 85-86.  It should be clarified that 
the “moral irrelevance” of familial advantages does not suggest that principles of justice 
govern all familial relations.  Rawls is, after all, unequivocal in his discussion of the “public 
domain” that principles cannot regulate those types of household activities that are not 
abusive to individual members.  Instead, Rawls advances the narrower claim that 
information about one’s ultimate family should be concealed from agents when they choose 
the principles of justice to govern society.  
201 RAWLS, THEORY OF JUSTICE, supra note 84, at 64 (“[D]istributive shares are decided 
by the outcome of the natural lottery; and this outcome is arbitrary from a moral 
perspective.”).
202 Id. at 11.
203 Id. at 265.  
204 Id. at 448.
205 Id. at 64.  It is worth noting that Rawls often uses the word “born” as synonymous 
with “starting point.”  See id. at 81-86.  This usage is simply metaphorical, and surely does 
not indicate that information about pre-birth status cannot be placed behind the veil.
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to information about the families that individuals are conceived by?  It sure 
seems that way.  The Rawlsian “relevance” analysis, after all, turns on 
arbitrariness, and there seems no reason to distinguish the born from the
unborn based on the arbitrariness of their families.  Because the fetus quite 
clearly has no more control over its starting point than does the born human, it 
seems similarly unable to take credit for membership in its family.206   The 
presumed original position, which demands that agents have access to 
information about their mother’s likelihood to harm her fetus, is therefore 
unreasonable.
This unreasonableness has significant consequences.  It shows that a 
Rawlsian cannot in good faith endorse the current legal blend of fetal-homicide 
laws and abortion rights.  As demonstrated by Section C, the selection process 
at the presumed original position is the only plausible way agents adopting 
justice as fairness as the political conception of justice could conceivably 
implicate principles of justice matching our current fetal-rights scheme.  This
presumed original position, however, is not reasonable in a Rawlsian sense 
because it fails to place irrelevant personal information behind the veil of 
ignorance.  We can necessarily conclude that, for societies endorsing Rawls's
justice as fairness as a political conception, the contemporary approach to fetal 
personhood is inherently “matchless” and thus in a permanent state of 
reflective disequilibrium.207  And remember that societal judgments in such
disequilibrium will ultimately seek equilibrium by conforming to a Rawlsian 
principle of justice.  To put it plainly, the current bifurcated fetal-rights scheme 
is fundamentally unsustainable from a Rawlsian perspective.
206 Some fetuses are conceived by women who use illicit drugs or suffer from illness, 
while others are conceived by women who are conscientious about pre-natal care.  This is, 
of course, an arbitrary distribution of assets from the fetus’s perspective.
207 A projection of instability prompts the question: In which direction will our 
judgments shift?  Rawls might suggest we begin by examining the principles that would be 
implicated at a “reformed” version of the presumed original position.  See RAWLS, THEORY 
OF JUSTICE, supra note 84, at 19 (“[T]he conditions embodied in the description of the 
original position are ones that we do in fact accept.  Or if we do not, then perhaps we can be 
persuaded to do so by philosophical reflection.” (emphasis added)).  An original position is 
reformed when all morally irrelevant information is isolated and placed behind the veil of 
ignorance.  As stated in Part III, information about whether mothers are likely to harm their 
fetuses is morally irrelevant.  Agents at the reformed original position, which of course 
includes representatives of fetuses at all stages of gestation, would likely choose a 
conception with given principles that entitle fetuses to human rights against both third 
parties and their mothers.  A contrary conception, whereby the rights of the fetus are 
subordinated to those of its mother, even if confined to early stages of gestation, would 
present an intolerable degree of risk to the agents.  Similarly, leaving the decision to public 
reasoning would not sufficiently mitigate this risk.  
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CONCLUSION
The right to abortion, when juxtaposed with the current set of legal 
protections afforded fetuses, is politically and morally unsustainable from a 
Rawlsian perspective.  On a political level, a reformation of the bifurcated 
fetal-rights scheme can be expected if society has endorsed, or will endorse at 
some later point, Rawls’s justice as fairness as its political conception of 
justice.  The Article takes no position, of course, on the political stability of the 
scheme if society never settles on justice as fairness.  But even if our society is 
indefinitely governed by an alternative political conception, the theoretical 
study here promises to have direct implications on how particular individuals 
view the morality of the fetal-rights scheme.  The scheme, after all, cannot be 
supported in public reason by that sector of our population which adheres to 
justice as fairness as a moral conception.208  These persons will need to either 
(1) decrease their support of the current brand of fetal-homicide legislation,209
or (2) decrease their support of maternal liberty.210  Importantly, this Article 
does not suggest that the bifurcated rights-scheme poses moral problems for all
persons.  For instance, a utilitarian or a classical natural-rights adherent might 
have far less trouble reconciling the bifurcated scheme – it is, of course, not 
unheard of for these conceptions to legitimize dual notions of personhood.211  
In sum, the bifurcated fetal-rights scheme is politically unstable if we are in, or 
moving toward, a Rawlsian political conception of justice, and it is, and always 
will be, a morally untenable judgment for those persons who remain 
committed to Rawls’s vision of a just society.
208 Rawls was clear in his later writings that justice as fairness was a political conception 
as well as a moral conception.  See JOHN RAWLS, Justice as Fairness: Political Not 
Metaphysical, in JOHN RAWLS: COLLECTED PAPERS, supra note 11, at 388, 411 (“Some may 
even affirm justice as fairness as a natural moral conception that can stand on its own 
feet.”).
209 This would likely be achieved by treating fetuses as non-persons vis-à-vis all parties.  
Presumably this could be accomplished by returning to the traditional “feticide” laws, which 
tend to focus on protecting and vindicating the rights of the mother rather than the harmed 
fetus.  
210 We might see the mother’s liberty curtailed to the point where the only lawful 
abortions are those consistent with theories of self-defense.
211 See, e.g., JOHN RAWLS, The Independence of Moral Theory, in JOHN RAWLS:
COLLECTED PAPERS, supra note 11, at 286, 298 (stating that utilitarian thought focuses “on 
valuable experiences themselves, and the only thing that counts is the net total held by all 
container-persons together”); STEVEN R. HAYNES, NOAH’S CURSE: THE BIBLICAL 
JUSTIFICATION OF AMERICAN SLAVERY (2002) (discussing the religious, natural law-oriented 
ideology which helped maintain the institution of slavery in the antebellum American 
South).
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APPENDIX A
The following twenty-four states currently recognize victim capacity upon 
conception:212
Alabama:  The term “victim” is defined to include “an unborn child in utero 
at any stage of development.”
Alaska:  The crime of “murder” encompasses acts causing the death of an 
unborn child at any stage of development.
Arizona:  The killing of an “unborn child” at any stage of prenatal 
development is either negligent homicide, manslaughter, second-degree 
murder, or first-degree murder.
Georgia:  A person is guilty of feticide, feticide by vehicle, or voluntary 
manslaughter if they cause the killing of an unborn child “at any state of 
development who is carried in the womb.”
Idaho:  The term “murder” includes the killing of “a human embryo or 
fetus” under certain conditions.
Illinois:  The killing of an “unborn child” at any stage of prenatal 
development is intentional homicide, voluntary manslaughter, involuntary 
manslaughter, or reckless homicide.
Kentucky: The offense of “fetal homicide” protects “member[s] of the 
species homo sapiens in utero from conception onward, without regard to age, 
health, or condition of dependency.”
Louisiana:  The killing of “any individual of the human species from 
fertilization and implantation until birth” is first degree feticide, second degree 
feticide, or third degree feticide.
Michigan:  Actions that intentionally, or in wanton or willful disregard for 
consequences, cause a “miscarriage or stillbirth” or cause “aggravated physical 
injury to an embryo or fetus,” are classified as felonies.
212 ALA. CODE § 13A-6-1(a)(3) (LexisNexis 2006); ALASKA STAT. § 11.41.150 (2006); 
ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 13-1102 to -1105 (Supp. 2006); GA. CODE ANN. §§ 16-5-80, 40-6-
393.1 (Supp. 2006); IDAHO CODE ANN. § 18-4001 (2004); 720 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 5/9-
1.2, -2.1, -3.2 (West 2002); KY. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 507A.010-060 (LexisNexis Supp. 
2006); LA. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 14:2(11), 14:32.5-14:32.8 (2007); MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. 
§ 750.14 (West 2004); MINN. STAT. ANN. §§ 609.21, .266(a), .2661-.2665 (West 2003); 
MISS. CODE ANN. § 97-3-37(1) (2005); NEB. REV. STAT. §§ 28-389(2), -391 to -394 (Supp. 
2006); N.D. CENT. CODE §§ 12.1-17.1-01 to -04 (1997); OHIO REV. CODE ANN. §§ 2903.01 
to .06, 2903.09(A) (LexisNexis 2006); OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 21 §§ 652, 691, 713 (West 
Supp. 2007); OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 63 § 1-730 (West 2004); 18 PA. CONS. STAT.
ANN. §§ 2603-2605, 3203 (West 1998); S.C. CODE ANN. § 16-3-1083 (2006); S.D. CODIFIED 
LAWS §§ 22-1-2(50A), 22-16-1.1, -15, -20, -41 (2006 & Supp. 2007); TEX. PENAL CODE 
ANN. § 1.07(a)(26) (Vernon Supp. 2006); UTAH CODE ANN. §§ 76-5-201 to -209 (2003 & 
Supp. 2007); VA. CODE ANN. § 18.2-32.2(A) (2004); W. VA. CODE ANN. § 61-2-30 
(LexisNexis 2005); WIS. STAT. ANN. §§ 939.75, 940.01, .02, .05-.10 (West 2005); State v. 
Knapp, 843 S.W.2d 345, 347-48 (Mo. 1992) (en banc); State v. Holcomb, 956 S.W.2d 286, 
290 (Mo. Ct. App. 1997).
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Minnesota:  The killing of an “unborn child” at any stage of prenatal 
development is characterized as murder, manslaughter, or criminal vehicular 
homicide.
Mississippi:  The term “human being” includes “an unborn child at every 
stage of gestation from conception until live birth and the term ‘unborn child’ 
means a member of the species homo sapiens, at any stage of development, 
who is carried in the womb.”
Missouri:  The term “human being” includes an “unborn child” at any stage 
of prenatal development, at least under the involuntary manslaughter and first-
degree murder statutes.
Nebraska:  The killing of an “unborn child” at any stage of prenatal 
development is murder in the first or second degree, manslaughter, or motor 
vehicle homicide.
North Dakota:  The killing of an “unborn child” at any stage of prenatal 
development is murder, felony murder, manslaughter, or negligent homicide.
Ohio:  The killing “of an unborn member of the species homo sapiens, who 
is or was carried in the womb of another,” is aggravated murder, murder, 
voluntary manslaughter, involuntary manslaughter, reckless homicide, 
negligent homicide, aggravated vehicular homicide, vehicular homicide, or 
vehicular manslaughter.
Oklahoma: “[U]nborn offspring of human beings from the moment of 
conception” are considered unique victims of criminal activity.
Pennsylvania:  The killing of an “an individual organism of the species 
homo sapiens from fertilization until live birth” is criminal homicide classified 
as murder in the first, second, or third degree, or voluntary manslaughter.
South Carolina: A “child in utero” at any stage of development injured 
during an act of criminal violence is a separate victim of a separate offense.
South Dakota:  The killing of an “unborn child” at any stage of prenatal 
development is fetal homicide, manslaughter, or vehicular homicide.
Texas:  “[A]n unborn child at every stage of gestation from fertilization until 
birth” is to be protected by the entire criminal code.
Utah:  The killing of an “unborn child” at any stage of prenatal development 
is treated as any other homicide if the rest of the elements of that homicide are 
met.
Virginia:  “Any person who unlawfully, willfully, deliberately, maliciously 
and with premeditation kills the fetus of another” is guilty of “homicide.”
West Virginia:  “[A] pregnant woman and the embryo or fetus she is 
carrying in the womb constitute separate and distinct victims” for purposes of 
laws prohibiting crimes of violence.
Wisconsin: “[W]hoever causes the death of an unborn child with intent to 
kill that unborn child [or] kill the woman who is pregnant with that unborn 
child” is guilty of homicide.    
